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What is the effect of increased wages on physician’s working hours and sector choice?  
This study applies an econometric framework that allows for non-convex budget sets, non-
linear labor supply curves and imperfect markets with institutional constraints. The physicians 
are assumed to make choices from a finite set of job possibilities, characterized by practice 
form, hours and wage rates. The individuals may combine their main position with an extra 
job, opening for a variety of combinations of hours in the respective jobs.  
I take into account the complicated payment schemes for physicians, taxes and household 
characteristics when estimating labor supply on Norwegian micro data. The results show a 
modest response in  total hours to a wage increase, but a reallocation of hours in favor of the 
sector with increased wages.  
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1. Introduction 
In most countries the health authorities try to influence the physicians’ choice of 
specialization, practice type and working hours. Regulation through quotas has been 
widely used in countries with a National Health Service (NHS). With the deregulation 
of health markets, incentives such as the physician’s pay and practice income play a 
relatively more important role in the implementation of health policies. The purpose 
of this paper is to analyze how economic incentives affect the labor supply of 
physicians. Thus, I will estimate the effect of increased wages on the physicians’ total 
working hours and their preferred combination of hours in the main job and hours in 
an extra job or private practice.  
 
A combination of jobs is common for physicians and it is important to focus on the 
job mix as it seems reasonable to assume that the physicians work differently in 
public and private services, facing different sets of incentives and budget 
mechanisms. The interaction between the main job and the extra jobs is also of 
interest. Iversen (1997) analyses public consultants treating private patients in their 
spare time and the possible influences on priorities and efficiency during their public 
working hours. The consultants might be tempted to ease their effort in their hospital 
job to recruit enough patients to the private evening practice. The strength of these 
effects is arguable, but to assume that the health authorities have an idea of how 
physicians function in the different sectors or segments of the health care market, and 
which patients they serve, seems reasonable. An efficient implementation of the 
health priorities will thus embrace preferences of practice forms, including a 
preference of a whether a consultant should spend her spare time working extra hours 
in a public facility or in a private practice. 
 
The resource use in the health care market is significant. The physician labor is an 
important input both directly, and as the ‘captain of the ship’ with responsibility for 
initiating the treatment and choosing the quality of the care provided. In most OECD 
countries the physicians are partially or fully publicly funded while practicing. The 
health authorities motivate the funding in their responsibility to ensure the population 
access to health services. Still, many countries suffer from personnel shortages in 
general or have an uneven distribution of personnel with shortages in the public 
sector, in certain medical specialties or practices and in some regions. 
 
In a country like Norway with a NHS, the public sector dominates the job market for 
physicians. The largest employers are public hospitals, municipal primary care, 
central and local health administration, universities and research institutions. The 
private alternative is mainly self-employment in a private practice working with 
primary care or as a specialist in the secondary level. Private practices normally have 
a financial contract with the NHS. The public authorities strongly influences the 
earnings in the private practices by setting the fees refunded by the National insurance 
scheme. It is common to combine your main job with other engagements, particular a 
small private practice if you are an employed physician.  
 
To implement the health priorities public authorities directly restrict the physician’s 
access to specialist training by quotas, limits the access to public reimbursements and 
prohibits certain practice forms. An example is the 1986 restriction on new private 
inpatient facilities in Norway. Indirectly the governmental bodies achieve this through 3 
financial means. Examples are wage setting in public facilities, and regulations of 
reimbursements and fees in private practices.  
 
Pencavel (1986) summarizes the labor supply literature for men up to 1986 with the 
conclusion that the elasticities of hours with respect to wages are very small. As 
reported in Showalter and Thurston (1997), Heckman (1993) has gone so far as to 
suggest modifying George Stigler’s dictum “all elasticities are 1 in absolute value” to 
“elasticities are closer to zero than one for hours-of-work equations estimated for 
those who are working” (Heckman, 1993; italics in the original). Much of the 
literature has been focused on low- and middle-income individuals and families. 
Work by Feenberg and Poterba (1993) and Feldstein (1995) on high-income 
individuals suggest that these individuals are responsive to incentives. However, 
series of other studies have found no such effect for the high-income group, as 
presented in the survey by Røed and Strøm (2002).  
 
Showalter and Thurston (1997) present their analyses of US physicians as a 
continuation of the research on white-collar professions, and focus on tax effects on 
labor supply. A key finding is that self-employed physicians are sensitive to the 
marginal tax rate, with a supply elasticity of 0.33, whereas the effect is small and 
insignificant for employed physicians. In spite of a prosperous economic literature on 
physician behavior the labor supply studies are sparse. Those existing find that the 
wage elasticities of physicians who are not self-employed are modest. Examples are 
Sloan (1975) and Noether (1986). Rizzo and Blumenthal (1994) focus on the impact 
on labor supply of wage and non-wage income for a sample of self-employed US 
physicians. They find an uncompensated wage elasticity for male doctors of 0.23, 
with a compensated wage elasticity of 0.44. There are no published studies of 
physician labor supply on Norwegian data
1.   
 
In the literature that studies high-income individuals, the question remains whether 
there is a positive labor supply response to wage increases at all, or if the income 
effect dominates the substitution effect. By choosing a Box-Cox utility function to 
allow for a non-linear labor supply curve, the framework presented here may be better 
able to cope with these competing effects than models based on linear restrictions. 
The Box-Cox utility function is a rather flexible functional form with linear as well as 
log linear utility function as special cases. A common critique to the traditional 
studies of labor supply is that they do not address the complications created by 
institutional constraints like contracted working hours and absence of individual 
worker choice. The choice framework presented here is an attempt to address such 
issues.  
 
The physicians are, however, more flexible in their choice of working hours than 
many other professions. Even if they have fixed working hours in their main position, 
there are ample opportunities for extra work, e.g. working at the municipal causality 
clinic, with ambulant outpatient care, undertaking assessments for insurance 
                                                 
1 However there is a working paper by Baltagi, Bratberg and Holmås (2003) analysing 1303 
Norwegian physicians working as hospital consultants over the period 1993-97. They estimate a long-
run wage elasticity of about 0.55, and reject the static model that estimate the short run wage 
elasticities to slightly above 0.3. A possible reason for their high elasticities compared to other studies 
might be their use of a log-linear framework, with no explicit modelling of taxes and not including 
seconds jobs in their analysis.    4 
companies or private practice. Combinations of jobs are common in Norway, 
especially for public physicians. There is no general prohibition of private extra 
practice for NHS employees.  
 
The observed fact that physicians work long hours may either be due to economic 
incentives or other attributes of the job. There are many attributes of a job that are 
partly or fully unobservable to the researcher. Examples are shift work, the possibility 
for maternity leave, expected working hours, workload, how challenging the work is, 
etc. These characteristics will in many cases determine the labor supply. These 
characteristics, except for sector choice are captured by random elements in 
preferences and choice sets.  
 
The main finding is a limited response in the total labor supply to a wage increase, 
corresponding to results reported in the literature for high-income professionals and 
employed physicians. Knowing the physician’s high initial workload, and the 
complicated institutional regulations, this seems reasonable. There are however 
potential for changes in sector mix in response to a sector-specific wage increase. The 
model predicts the observed changes in hours worked fairly satisfactory; the hours 
worked in the main job are slightly underpredicted whereas the hours in the extra job 
are slightly overpredicted.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives an overview of the 
characteristics of the physician labor market in Norway. The model and data are 
described in Section 3 and 4, while Section 5 present the results, and includes a 
section where the estimated parameters are utilized when predicting choices in 1997. 
The predictions are evaluated through comparison with the chosen alternatives. The 
final section provides conclusions and points out directions for further research.  
 
 
2. Characteristics of the Physician Labor Market 
In Norway the health services are mainly publicly financed and provided by the 
government. Norway spends about 8 percent of GDP on health. This is approximately 
2,400 US$ PPP (purchasing power parities) annually (OECD 2002), of which 85 
percent is publicly financed. The private share is mainly out-patient co-payments as 
in-patient services are offered free of charge. The primary care services are today 
mainly provided by private practitioners on public contracts, but as we are focusing 
on the time period prior to the 2001 family physician reform, there was a mix of 50 
percent private providers with contract, 40 percent ‘municipal health officers’. The 
rest where private providers with no or a part refund from the National Insurance 
Scheme, and interns in their final practice year before qualifying. The provision of 
outpatient services is shared between special wards at the hospitals and specialists in 
private practices. The inpatient services are covered by government providers or Non 
Governmental organizations (NGOs) with a public contract. There is waiting time for 
almost all non-acute health services that are publicly provided, normally months but 
in some low-priority cases, also years. In Norway it is prohibited to supply privately 
financed inpatient services, with the exemption of some hospitals with a National 
capacity below 100 beds. However, there is ample supply of private outpatient 
services offering the same services as hospital outpatient clinics for those who have 
sufficient willingness to pay. After public procurement to reduce NHS waiting lists, 
most private surgical procedures are paid out of pocket, as private health insurance 5 
schemes covers only a minimal share of the population.  
 
After 6 years at the university, the medical students continue in internship with 1 year 
of hospital practice and 6 months of primary care practice. To become a licensed 
specialist you must undertake a training program while practicing as a jr. physician at 
a hospital or in a similar arrangement for primary care providers (PCPs). The median 
number of years from authorization to licensing as a specialist is 10 years in our 
sample. Traditionally a central committee has controlled the distribution of junior 
physicians and hospitals consultants. During the nineties there seemed to be an 
increased tendency of local initiatives where hospitals strengthened their physician 
staff without such permits. In accordance with an increased market orientation in the 
health care sector there seems to be a tendency that wage and other job characteristics 
will be more important for the distribution of the physicians and as a means for the 
health authorities to attract personnel.  
 
There is almost full work force participation among physicians, with few people 
working part time and an insignificant group working in non-health sectors. A normal 
pattern is to work extra hours, but many physicians also work in a second position or 
evening practice. According to the Norwegian Medical Association (2002) there were 
15.300 physicians in Norway below 67 years at the end of 1999. A rapidly increasing 
share of women had reached 31 percent that year. 59 percent of the workforce were 
qualified specialists.  
 
From 1994 to 1999 there were 1.900 Norwegians who completed their training and 
were licensed as physicians. In the same period a striking number of 6.000 from other 
nationalities received a permanent or a temporary license valid for six months of 
practice. The high number of licensed foreign physicians was due to active 
recruitment in the other Scandinavian countries and Germany. Many never arrived in 
Norway after all, whereas others returned after a period of practice. Approximately 
2.300 physicians with other nationalities were active in 1999/2000 of which 1.500 had 
permanent residences and 800 temporary residences. 35 percent of the foreign 
physicians had a licensed specialty. In 1999 8.000 physicians worked mainly in public 
hospitals and 3.800 worked in primary care as municipal employees or in private 
practice with public funding. 800 specialists worked in private practice with public 
funding as their main practice. 300 physicians worked in companies, 600 in research 
and development and 400 in health administration. Private-for-profit hospitals where 
manned by a small number of full-time employees, supplemented by public hospital 
physicians working part time.  
 
There were about 800 vacant public positions reported in 1997, the period this 
analysis focuses on. These vacancies existed in spite of campaigns to recruit foreign 
personnel, and as the increases in educational capacity were beginning to take effect. 
Even though the institutional set-up and physician coverage rate varies a lot between 
countries, it is easy to find similar challenges in guiding personnel to serve the 
population with highest needs, in the other Scandinavian countries and the UK.  
 
As this paper is focusing on the supply side in the physician market, important aspects 
of the demand for physician labor is disregarded. The obvious reason is the need to 
simplify the model. The empirical argument is the many vacant positions that should 
support the assumption that there were few restrictions on the demand side and ample 6 
opportunities for the physicians to find their preferred combination of jobs and 
working hours. On the other hand, the public providers faced block grants until July 
1997 when an activity based funding was introduced. This budget restriction may 
have forced the hospital administration to cut down hours of planned overtime to keep 
the budget. But even with restrictions on public hours, the physicians are free to 
combine their hospital position with private practice or other jobs. Another motivation 
for public hospital physicians to have a second job in a private practice is the 
possibility to deduct practice related expenses from your earnings prior to taxation. 
The expenses include rents for an office in your own home, computer, books and 
journals. The register data utilised in this paper reports only income after deduction of 
these expenses.  
 
There is a selection process driving the choice of specialty, sector, participation and 
working hours. As almost all physicians work full-time the variation in working hours 
consists of extended hours in the main job and/or extra private practice. The wage 
differentials between specialties and sectors are significantly compressed compared to 
in the US, and the matching process seems less driven by expected income than in 
many other countries. E.g. the acceptability of shift-work seems to be important for 
the sector choice. There are still specialty differences in status and gender mix, with a 
higher female share in primary care and psychiatrics. In private practice the 
importance of unobserved heterogeneity is probably more important as a determinant 
for earnings than for the other sectors.  
 
All analyses are made conditional on the physicians’ choice of specialty. Given the 
short-term perspective of this analysis it is not possible to model the selection into 
specialities like Nicholson and Soules (2001). However, the individual specific wages 
capture the effect speciality has on earnings. The five alternative job categories are 
made general enough to be relevant for all specialities. Each physician should find 
attractive jobs in all categories. Individual specific choice sets are not implemented in 
this paper.  
 
When analyzing the labor supply of physicians we face some additional difficulties 
we are only partly able to deal with. The market for health personnel consists of a few 
large buyers in the public sector and a dominant public insurance scheme for the 
private practices. This implies that we have elements of a monopsonistic labor market 
where the buyers face an upward sloping supply curve. When considering a wage 
increase to attract the marginal worker, the hospital must take into account that they 
also must increase the wage for all physicians at the hospital. In the public sector the 
wage bargaining is centralized, and seniority, formal qualifications and working hours 
seems to determine earnings together with the amount of overtime. Hours per week 
are dependent on the number of physicians sharing a shift plan. This is partly decided 
by the chief physician at the ward level and her preferences. For a private practitioner 
with a public contract the earnings are decided by a block grant from the municipality, 
and fee for service with fixed fees. Private practitioners without a public contract, e.g. 
hospital physicians working private ‘overtime’, are more market based in their price 
setting.  
 
In the following we let the physicians choose between five sectors or job types. The 
alternatives are given in Table 1: Hospitals, separated in Oslo and rest of the country 
due to the higher wage in Oslo, Public primary care, Private practice and Other 7 
practices like health administration and research and development. To simplify the 
analysis, there is only one possible extra job when the main job is selected. The extra 
job is Private practice, except Other practices for those who are self-employed. In 
Appendix 1 Table A1 presents the distribution of main jobs actually chosen.  
 
 
Table 1. Choice of sectors – Main job and extra job. 
 
Main job 
Extra job – The most common 
alternative given the main job 
Hospitals outside of Oslo  Private practice 
State and local hospitals in Oslo  Private practice 
Public Primary Care/ 
Municipal Medical Officer 
Private practice 
Private practice  Other 
Other Private  practice 
 
 
3. Model and econometric issues   
The approach presented here assumes that the agents choose among job packages, or 
more correct - combination of jobs, each being defined by a main job and an extra job 
with specific choices of hours. A job is described by hours in the main job i,  i H and a 
wage rate per hour in the main job  ( ) ii WH  dependent on the hours worked. In 
addition the individual may work  j h  hours in the extra job with a payment  j w  per 
hour, independent of hours. In addition there are other job characteristics i, that may 
affect preferences and hence choices. As an example we may think of specific skills 
involved in the main job, patient mix or shift work.  
 
The problem solved by the physician looks like the following:  
  
(, , ) max [ ( ( ) , ), , ]
ij




(,,() ,, ) . iji i j HhWH wi B ∈            ( 2 )  
 
 
The f(.) function represents the net-of-tax income which is a compound of earnings in 
the main job, earnings in the extra job and other income as described below. The next 
element in the utility function is leisure time represented with the sum of hours 
worked in the two jobs. The last two elements is a representation of other 
characteristics of the jobs.  
 
The set B is the opportunity set, i.e. it contains all the opportunities available to the 
individual. We exclude non-market opportunities from B
2 as the share of physicians 
not participating in the labor market is negligible. Thus for all physicians Hi >0, but 
0 j h ≥ . The physicians do not differ in the number of available jobs, as I have chosen 
                                                 
2 See Aaberge , Colombino, Strøm & Wennemo (1998) for an example including non-market 
opportunities.  8 
5 job type categories that should be a feasible choice set to all physicians
3. Note that 
for the same physician, wage rates may differ across jobs, and that the wage rates vary 
with hours worked at hospitals and in primary care. Knowing their contract we are 
able to derive the compensations schemes for extended hours.  
 
The five alternative sectors or practice types are {Hospitals outside of Oslo, Hospitals 
in Oslo, Primary Care, Private practice, Other}. The physicians have a choice of Hi 
={18, 22, 28, 35.5, 37.5, 40.5, 45.5, 50, 55} hours per week in main job i. The choice 
of zero hours in the main job is excluded from the choice set. In addition to a main 
job, the model opens for hj = {0, 6, 12, 18, 24} hours per week in extra job. As 
presented in the previous section I assume that the physicians chose the same type of 
extra job, given their main job. E.g. if the main job is as a hospital consultant, the 
extra job is in a private practice, the most common type of extra job observed for each 
practice type. 
 
In part of the analysis I restrict the alternatives to the choice between a hospital job 
with or without an extra job. I do, however, open up for a variety in the combinations 
of working hours in the two jobs. The reason for the focus on a subset of hospital 
physicians is the superiority of the data offering reliable observations of hours 
worked. 
 
Let Ci be disposible household income after tax per year when the physician works Hi 
hours in the main job i and h hours in the extra job  with Wi (Hi)  being wage per hour 
in main job and  i w  wage per hour in the extra job given the choice of main job i. 
Wi(Hi) is a piecewise linear wage relation in main job i capturing the agreed terms in 
overtime compensation. This is particularly important when analysing the labour 
supply of hospital consultants as they have a relatively moderate regular wage rate, 
but a complicated package of different compensations for extended working hours 
and night shifts
4. When the extra job is set to private practice, the physicians face the 
same costs, reimbursements and fees for the marginal patient as the first. This is only 
an approximation as fixed costs like office rental and medical equipment are 
significant for some specialties. The earnings in the main job and extra job is 
represented by  
 
Ri= Wi (Hi) Hi             (3) 
jj j rw h =  
 
Disposable income  corresponding to the choice i is given by the budget constraint  
 
                                                 
3 There are of course differences in choice sets related to specialties and geographic regions, but the 
broad categories of job types applied here should not be to limiting. The data restricts the number of 
jobs types we are able to model. E.g. we cannot separate income from a municipal casualty clinic or a 
private practice.   
 
4 A hospital consultant has a basic 37.5 hours working week, but shift work reduces this to 35.5 hours 
per week. Most physicians have agreed to a contract of extended working hours with 2.5 hours per 
week. This is paid with a regular wage rate, but compensated with an additional transfer of NOK 19900 
per year. For the interval from 38 to 40.5 hours per week they are compensated with 50 percent extra 
on their regular wage. This increases to 100% for the next five hours, whereas shift plans with more 
than 45.5 hours per week compensate the additional hours with 200 % extra. 9 
Cij= Ri+ j r+ I - T ( R i+ j r, I )          ( 4 )  
 
Where I is family income other than the physician’s own earnings (capital income 
after tax, spouses income after tax, transfers) and T is the tax function. A non trivial 
assumption made is that the spouse’s hours of work is exogenous  as there is reason to 
believe that the spouses choice of working hours will correlate, either negatively, e.g. 
if one of the parents must look after the children, or positively as they have 
preferences for spending their leisure together.  
 
Because preferences are not known to the analyst, I will assume a random utility 
model  
 
Ui=Vi+εi,            (5) 
  
where Ui is the utility when the physician works Hi hours in main job i and hj hours in 
the corresponing extra job. Vi is the deterministic element in the utility function and εi 
is a stochastic term with a iid extreme value distribution with expected mean 0 and 
variance 
22 /6 σπ . The random term εi captures the fact that attributes, here not 
observed, other than income and hours affect labor supply say type of job, shift work 
etc.  
 
The deterministic part of the preferences is represented by the following “Box-Cox” 
type utility function,  
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See for instance, Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) and Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm 
(1995) for empirical analyses applying this specification. An advantage with this  
specification is that it is flexible enough to yield both negative (back-ward bending 
labor supply curve) and positive wage elasticities. 8760 is the total number of annual 
hours, while α , λ , γ  and the  s β′  are unknown parameters. For the utility function 
to be quasi-concave, we require λ <1 and γ <1. Note that if  0 λ →  and  0 γ → , the 
utility function converges to a log-linear function. The characteristics are: X1= Age of 
the physician, X2= Number of children below six years of age, X3=1, if the spouse is 
not working, = 0 otherwise, X4=1, if the individual is from Norway; =0 otherwise, 
X5=1, if female;=0 otherwise. X6=1, if the physician is a specialist in surgery, internal 
medicine or laboratory medicine, =0 otherwise.  
 
In traditional labor supply offered wages are determined by human capital 
characteristics and offered hours are uniformly distributed. However, in real life 
wages may vary across sectors for observationally identically workers, and jobs with 
specific number of hours may be more available in the market than other jobs, say 
“full time” jobs. Thus, when the physicians make their choice with respect to labor 10 
supply they choose between job-packages with different wage and hours profiles.  
 
I assume that the physicians make their choices by maximizing utility, given the job-
packages available in the market. As already mentioned, the analyst does not observe 
preferences neither does he observe all details of the job-packages available in the 
market. Let B be the (random) set of job-packages available to an individual and let 
(,) ii j PHh  be the probability that Hi  hours are worked in the main job i and h are 
worked in the side job with a wage rate that follows the choice of main job i. Hours in 
the side job is uniformly distributed. Thus  
 
{} ,,
(,)P r ( m a x )
ij




==         ( 8 )  
 
I follow the modeling explained in Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999) and get  
 
exp( / ) ( , )
(,)












        ( 9 )  
 
Due to the assumption of extreme value distributed utilities it follows readily that the 
choice probabilities are multinominal logit. By setting  (.) i g =1 in (9) we get the 
standard multinominal logit. The reason why the  (.) i g  function enters the choice 
probabilities is due to job-specific offered hours and wages available in the market. 
The (.) i g  function is a probability density and is related to the fact that the individual 
faces opportunity sets B that are random to the analyst. The interpretation of the 
opportunity density extended version of the standard multinominal logit given in (9) is 
that the attractiveness of a choice measured by exp( / ) i V σ  is weighted by a function 
saying how available this choice is in the market. For more details about this 
methodology I refer to Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999).  
 
Next we have  
 
12 (,) () () ii i i i gH W g Hg W =                          (10) 
 
where  1 () ii gHis the marginal probability density of offered hours. We will assume 
that offered hours are uniformly distributed except at full time hours. This density is 
assumed to reflect that offered hours, except for full time working load, is equally 
available in the market. Thus  
 
11 2 ( ) exp( ) ii i gH K L ν ν =+                          (11) 
 
where  i K =1 if the main job is full-time (35.5 hours per week or more), and  i K =0 
otherwise.  i L =1 if main job is private, and  i L =0 otherwise. The latter captures the fact 
that if the main job is private, the hours available in the market will be less (or not) 
regulated relative to jobs in the public sector.  
 
The conditional wage density  2| (|) ii i gWH is a log-normal probability density. In the 11 
estimation of the model I have estimated  2| (|) ii i gWHin a two-stage (Heckman) 
procedure. The estimated wage equation is then used to calculate disposable income.  
See Appendix 2 for the estimation of wages, conditional on offered hours.  
 
It should be noted that the offered wages depend on hours worked; that is 
() ii i WW H = . This expression also enters the deterministic part of the utility function 
through disposable income  i C . The reason why I am able to identify  / i V σ  and 
2 (|) ii i gWHis because I use detailed institutional information to derive how offered 
wages  i W  vary with hours worked. Given this institutional information wage 
equations are estimated to capture how human capital characteristics and sector-
specific constants affect expected wages. The parameters (α, λ, γ, β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5 
, β6,  1 ν ,  2 ν ) are estimated in a maximum-likelihood procedure. Note that σ is not 
identified and is absorbed in α and β.   
 
  
4. Sample and variable construction 
This study is based on several of the administrative data registers covering Norwegian 
residents. Using the register of authorized health personnel as an identifier I link 
information about demography, income and employment relations. The main years of 
analysis are 1995 and 1997. Our trimming procedure excludes personnel below 28 
and above 66 years of age, as many retire at 67. Some personnel categories have 
access to early retirement, but it was not common at that time. Individuals with 
inconsistent professional status, or missing important variables are excluded. 
Summary statistics for key individual level variables are provided in Appendix 1. The 
sample consists of 9663 individuals in 1995 and 12252 in 1997 as presented in Table 
A3. Some sets of analysis have additional restrictions and the number of observations 
is reported in the respective sections.  
 
Authorized foreign physicians are excluded when they do not have a permanent 
residency in Norway, or if they have a permanent residency code, but no income or 
address in Norway. Some people in this group achieve an authorization but never 
arrive in Norway. Others, like many of the Scandinavians, work in Norway for a 
shorter period (up to 6 months). These physicians are often fully employed in their 
home countries and work in Norway in holidays or if they have a week off in their 
shift plan.  
 
Data quality  
I have information about the date of medical authorization and specialization for up to 
three specialist licenses for all physicians ‘accumulated’ in 1998. I assume that the 
latest achieved specialty is the one that is practiced. There are asymmetries in the 
information level depending on whether the physicians are employed or in private 
practice, and on the type of employer. For all groups I have information about annual 
earnings prior and after taxation, employment status, and demographic variables.  
 
For employees I have days worked during the year and annual earnings by employer. 
Start and stop days are, however, a bit fuzzy as many employers report of an 
employment during the whole year even though the actual job was short term. 
Statistics Norway has developed an estimate of hours worked per year by employer 12 
and totally. There is also a more robust measure with information about hours worked 
presented in broad categories: Less than 4 hours, 4-19 hours, 20-29 hours, and 30 
hours or more per week. All employers are coded by the NACE Standard Industrial 
Classification, which gives us detailed information of their sector and type of activity. 
Institutional knowledge of the different industries and categories of employers 
provides information of regular working hours. 
 
For employees in institutions owned by municipalities and county authorities I have in 
addition information on wages and regular working hours for one month during each 
year. For most of these institutions I also have the possibility of calculating the 
amount of planned and unplanned extra hours. The Norwegian Association of Local 
and Regional Authorities (NALRA) collects the data at October 1
st. At this time of the 
year the central wage bargaining is completed but the local wage bargaining is not 
completed and thus not registered. There are some minor inconsistencies, which I 
ignore, between the monthly salary and the registered annual income from the same 
employer. In addition to the mentioned unregistered local wage increase, this is 
probably due to uneven workload throughout the year as the physicians work extra 
overtime in periods with high workload or when many physicians are on leave during 
summer, or other extraordinary activities, like campaigns to reduce patient waiting 
lists. The NALRA covers most hospitals, public primary care and local health 
administrations. 
 
For those working at hospitals owned by the central government or contracted 
charities, I have access to their job contract for jr. physicians and specialist 
consultants. I also know that a physician working at one of the two hospitals owned 
by the central government has the same contract as those working for the municipality 
of Oslo. However, these prestigious hospitals have a reputation of ‘demanding’ an 
extra unpaid effort of aspiring physicians. Physicians working for non-profit private 
hospitals in other localities have the same terms as the non-Oslo NALRA employees. 
I am thus able to have a well-informed opinion about their regular and extended 
working hours knowing their annual income, years of experience and specialty for all 
physicians. The same goes for other public employers like central health authorities or 
general administration.  
 
For self-employed physicians I have no information about hours worked in the 
register data. Using a study by Statistics Norway of self-reported working hours and 
income for primary care providers and private specialist consultants I have some 
guidance on the distribution of working hours for these groups. I assume that all of the 
self-employed’s earnings are health related. Most of the PCPs and private specialist 
have a contract with their municipality or county council and the National Insurance 
scheme.  
 
I approximate the private hourly income based on our knowledge on annual private 
income and average income per hour from survey data. This probably underestimates 
the private wages for hospital consultants, and thus overestimates the hours worked 
privately. Anecdotal evidence indicates an hourly wage of about NOK 1000, or three 
times the average of the estimated wage for fulltime private specialist practitioners. 
Looking at private income in detail there are significant variations between the 
specialties. Physicians working with ear, nose and throat and ophthalmology are on 
top with 20 percent of their total income from private practice, others like brain 13 
surgery had a significantly lower share. The physicians have the right to deduct 
private practice expenses from their earnings prior to taxation. The expenses include 
home office rent, computer, literature, phone, broadband etc. and create an extra 
motivation for employees to work in a second job as a private practitioner. The 
register data only include private income after these deductions. This leads to a 
downward bias in the estimated hours.  
 
Hourly wage is the applied earnings measure for the employees too. For most 
physicians this is straight forward, as I know the monthly regular wage and working 
hours. The centralized wage determination in the health sector, with almost identical 
wages and fees trough out the country simplifies this task. For 2775 physicians in 
1995 and 1553 in 1997 I also know the compensation for working extended hours, 
and when the different overtime compensations (50%, 100% and 200%) take effect.  
Hospital physicians must work longer than their regular working hours of 37.5 hours 
per week or 35.5 hours per week for those working shifts. There is a national 
agreement to extend the weekly hours by 2.5. In addition there is local agreements at 
the ward level extending the total hours per week up to 48 hours per week in the shift 
plan for all physicians. The amount of planned overtime depends on factors like 
patient load, the number of vacant positions and shift plan. In addition there is a need 
for “unplanned” overtime work in situations with absent personnel or a high 
workload. Some wards split the overtime “fairly” and include almost all overtime in 
the planned part. Other wards may reduce the planned overtime all physicians must 
share, and leave the rest to unplanned overtime for those who volunteer.  
 
Holders of multiple jobs have been assigned a main job and an extra job. Personnel 
working fulltime in NALRA jobs or other public hospitals have this job assigned as 
their main job. For the rest of the sample the main job is the one with highest annual 
earnings. Each individual are only assigned two jobs. It is not uncommon to have 
even more jobs, but these tend to be minor both in hours and income and are 
neglected. The annual taxable earnings do however include all jobs. Each individual is 
assigned an hourly wage not only in the sectors they are observed but also a predicted 
wage if they were to work in some of the other sectors. I exploit the richness of the 
register data in this procedure, including specialty, residency and observed experience 




5. Empirical Results 
This section presents the results from four sets of analysis. The first three are based on 
subsets of hospital physicians working in 1995, the fourth set is an analysis of all 
physicians working in 1997. Each analysis contains a discussion of the estimated 
parameters of the model, before the observed and predicted choices of working hours 
and sector mix are presented. For the hospital physicians I also present an 
'experiment', using the parameters estimated on 1995 data to predict hours in 1997, 
utilizing hourly wages in 1997. This is no genuine panel data analysis, but a cross-
sectional analysis from 1995 used to make out of sample predictions in 1997. I 
evaluate these predictions through comparisons with the observed choices in 1997.  
 
The physicians choose between nine categories, or intervals, of hours in their main 
job and five categories of hours in the extra job. This is of course a simplification of 14 
the actual variation in working time, but should cover the most common choices. E.g. 
a primary care physician may face the choice of a fulltime private practice or a 
combination of four days a week in the private practice and one day working at the 
local mother & child health center. For the hospital physicians a more common choice 
is whether to spend their spare time working extended hours at the public hospital, or 
in a private practice. 
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Section 5.1 presents an analysis based on the largest available sets of hospital 
physicians with a complete NALRA dataset from 1995 or 1997. Section 5.2 limits the 
sample to male specialist consultants working with internal medicine, surgery or 
laboratory medicine. This is done to focus on a more homogenous group with a 
particular potential for private extra practice as their training is completed. Like 
section 5.1, the analysis in section 5.3 includes jr. and sr. physicians, but only those 
observed with complete records both in 1995 and 1997. Using an identical sample in 
1995 & 1997 simplifies the prediction evaluation when predicting out of sample in 
1997.  
 
I assume that the hospital physicians have an extra job in a private practice. If they do 
not work in a job number two I regard this as zero hours in this job. In sections 5.1-
5.3 I present the observed choices of hours in the hospital job and in the private job in 
1995, prior to four predictions for the same year. The first prediction is based on the 
observed wages, the second with a ten percent wage increase in the hospital sector, 
then a similar increase in private 'wages' only, and finally a ten percent increase in 
both wages. Section 5.4 continues with an 'experiment' - using the estimates from 
1995 to predict the choices for the hospital physicians in 1997 based upon observed 
wages this year. The predictions are compared with the observed choices in 1997.  
 15 
Section 5.5 adapts a broader perspective and includes all physicians allocated to five 
alternative sectors. The advantage of this approach is the ability to predict the changes 
in average working hours for all physicians from sector specific wage increases. The 
disadvantage is that I rely on data with poorer quality than the NALRA data. The 
extra job is also here restricted to private practice, the most common choice observed. 
The exception is private practitioners with other job types as their extra job. This 
includes education and research, health administration, NGOs, industrial medical 
officer etc. Section 5.6 sums up the general results. Appendix 4 presents figures 
illustrating the observations and predictions for the four sets.  
 
From Table 3 we observe that all parameters are sharply determined and that λ  and 
γ  are estimated to yield a quasi-concave utility function. On the data set considered 
to be of best quality λ  is estimated to be close to 1, which implies that utility is a 
linear function of income. It is interesting to note that the estimates of λ  and γ  are 
similar across these three first data sets.  16 
 
































            
  Utility function          
            
β0  Constant ’leisure element’  18.09 [.000] 20.83  [.000]  19.40 [.000]  4.80 [.000] 
β1  Age  0.05 [.068] 0.04  [.338]  0.13 [.013]  0.01 [.009] 
β2  Number of children below 6 years of age  1.33 [.000] 1.05  [.011]  1.56 [.005]  0.15 [.049] 
β3  =1 if spouse do not work, =0 otherwise  0.39 [.451] 1.46  [.068]  -0.41 [.655]  0.85 [.000] 
β4  =1 if the physician is from Norway, =0 otherwise  -0.87 [.109] -1.23  [.120]  -0.25 [.793]  -0.21 [.042] 
β5  =1 if female, =0 if male  3.72 [.000]     3.95 [.000]  0.48 [.000] 
β6  =1 if Hospital specialist, =0 otherwise  -1.23 [.004]     -1.31 [.077]     
α   Constant ‘consumption element’  2.23 [.000] 2.67  [.000]  2.79 [.000]  3.45 [.000] 
λ   Exponent ‘consumption element’  0.86 [.000] 0.85  [.000]  0.93 [.000]  0.59 [.000] 
γ   Exponent leisure  -1.50 [.000] -1.40  [.000]  -1.31 [.000]  -3.72 [.000] 
            
  Opportunity density*          
            
1 v   =1 if Works fulltime, =0 otherwise 
4.93 [.000] 5.08  [.000]  5.62 [.000]  -0.16 [.000] 
2 v   =1 if Private practitioner, =0 otherwise 
   
     
-2.10 [.000] 
             
Number of observations  2775   1521    1036   9528  
Log likelihood  -8397.03   -4676.53    -3099.03   -32933.6  
McFadden's Rho  0.21    0.19     0.21    0.36   
* For the wage equation see Appendix 2. 
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5.1 Hospital physicians 
The first subset contains all physicians working at NALRA hospitals in 1995 or 1997, 
with a complete record of overtime compensations. This includes physicians under 
specialist training and consultants. The model parameters presented in Table 3 are all 
significant with the exception some of the  s β  in the leisure component. The income 
term in the utility function (6) is estimated with a λ  of 0.86 and an α  of 2.23. The γ  
in the leisure component is estimated to -1.50.  2 β  and  5 β  are significant and positive, 
meaning that individuals with a child below 6 years of age and women appreciate 
leisure more than the average. The opposite occurs for the hospital specialist 
represented by  6 β . The elderly physicians appreciate leisure more than the average 
but this effect is not significant at the five percent level. The  s β  related to whether 
the spouse work or not and country background are less sharply determined. The g-
function in (11) with a dummy representing a fulltime position is represented with the 
significant parameter  1 v of 4.93. 
 
Table 4 Physicians at NALRA hospitals in 1995. Observed and Predicted Choices 
Jr. Physicians and Hospital Consultants 
         Predictions with  Predictions with  Predictions with 
     Observed Predicted 10%  increase  in  10% increase in   10% increase in 
       hours   Hours   hospital wages  private wages  all wages 
                        
Hours per week    s.d.  s.d.  s.d.  s.d.   s.d.
Hospital   42.3 (6.2) 41.8 (1.2) 42.5 (1.4) 41.7 (1.2)  42.4 (1.4)
Private extra practice  4.1 (6.2) 5.2 (0.9) 5.0 (0.9) 5.7 (1.0)  5.5 (1.0)
Total     46.5 (8.6) 47.0 (1.9) 47.5 (2.1) 47.4 (2.0)  47.9 (2.1)
                        
Hours per year                    
Hospital   2032 (298) 2008 (60) 2041 (68) 2002 (59)  2034 (67)
Private extra practice  198 (296) 250 (43) 240 (41) 275 (49)  264 (47)
Total     2230 (413) 2258 (93) 2281 (98) 2277 (97)  2299 (102)
                        
Elasticities          Total  Main job  Extra job     
Effect of an increase in hospital wages    0.10*(0.05) 0.16* (0.05) -0.40* (0.16)   
Effect of an increase in private wages    0.08*(0.02) -0.03* (0.01) 0.99* (0.14)   
Effect of an increase in all wages     0.18*(0.06) 0.13* (0.04) 0.56* (0.26)   
N=2775                      
                
Standard deviations in brackets.  
* Significantly different from zero at a 95 percent confidence level.                 
This table corresponds to Table P4 in Appendix 5..  
 
Table 4 presents the average hours in the hospital job and in the private extra practice. 
The corresponding Table P5 in the Appendix 4 presents the observed shares and 
predicted probabilities for the alternative choices of ‘job-mix’ for the nine categories 
of hours in the main job, in combination with the five possible alternatives in the extra 
job, which is used to derive the hours of work. The 2775 physicians have ‘observed’ 
average annual working hours per year of 2230. Their labor is shared between 2032 
hours per year, or 42 hours per week, in their hospital job, and 198 hours per year in a 
private job, corresponding to 4 hours per week.  
 
When I compare the ‘observed’ hours with the predictions from the model, I 
underpredict slightly hours in the hospital job (2008 hours versus 2032 hours) and 
overpredict of hours in the private practice (250 hours versus 198 hours), totaling to 
28 hours less per year in average. The ‘observed’ hospital working hours lies within 
the predicted confidence interval (standard deviation of 60). The private practice 
hours are less accurately predicted with a standard deviation of 43. The model thus 
predicts the total hours reasonably well, but the predictions of sector mix are slightly 18 
biased.  
 
In a policy analysis I now regard a 10 percent wage increase at the hospital job, 
keeping private ‘wages’ constant. The predictions are a small increase in hours in the 
hospital job, 33 hours per year or a 1.6 percent increase. There is a predicted reduction 
in the private extra job of 10 hours per year, or a 4 percent reduction. The total effect 
is predicted to 23 hours increase or 1 percent. The opposite effect is occurring with a 
10 percent ‘wage-‘ (fee) increase in private practice - 6 hours less per year at the 
hospital, and 25 hours more in the private practice. With a 10 percent wage increase 
in both sectors, the model predicts a mean increase in labor supply of 41 hours per 
year, where the hospital job absorb 26 hours of the increase.  
 
The wage elasticities are positive and significantly different from zero. Looking at 
changes in total hours from an increase in the hospital wage, I find a wage elasticity 
of 0.10. The sector specific elasticities are 0.16 in the hospital job and -0.40 in the 
private practice. The wage elasticity when increasing the private wages is 0.08 for 
total working hours, -0.03 in the hospital job and 0.99 in the private practice. With an 
increase in both wages the elasticity is 0.18, 0.13 at the hospital and 0.56 in the 
private practice. In all cases the total change in hours worked is moderate, with 
elasticities in the range of 0.1-0.2. The exception is the private practice with a small 
number of hours worked in the reference case creating high elasticities up to 1.  
 
5.2 Male hospital consultants  
Restricting the sample to male hospital consultants working with internal medicine, 
surgery or laboratory medicine leaves us with 1521 observations in 1995. This group 
is expected to be more active both in the main job and in particular the extra practice 
as their training is completed. Male physicians traditionally also have less leisure than 
their female colleagues. The model parameters are presented in Table 3. The income 
term in the utility function is estimated with a λ  of 0.85 and an α  of 2.67. The γ  in 
the leisure component is estimated to - 1.40.  2 β  is positive and significant, meaning 
that those with children below 6 years of age appreciate leisure more than the average. 
The  1 () ii gHg-function is represented with a parameter  1 v of 5.08. 
 
The consultants have ‘observed’ average annual working hours per year of 2305, 
shared between 2086 hours per year, or 43.5 hours per week, in their hospital job, and 
219 hours per year in a private job, corresponding to 4.6 hours per week.  19 
Table 5 
Male Hospital Consultants at NALRA Hospitals in 1995. 
Observed and Predicted Choices 
       Predictions with   Predictions with   Predictions with 
   Observed   Predicted 10%  increase  in   10% increase in   10% increase in 
     hours    hours   hospital wages  private wages  all wages 
                     
Hours per week                 
Hospital   43.5 (6.1)  42.9 (1.0) 43.9 (1.1) 42.7 (1.0) 43.7 (1.1)
Private extra practice  4.6 (6.2)  5.4 (0.6) 5.1 (0.5) 6.0 (0.7) 5.7 (0.6)
Total   48.0 (8.3)  48.3 (1.1) 49.0 (1.2) 48.7 (1.2) 49.4 (1.2)
                    
Hours per year                
Hospital   2086 (295)  2061 (47) 2107 (54) 2052 (46) 2098 (54)
Private extra practice  219 (299)  257 (27) 244 (26) 288 (31) 275 (30)
Total   2305 (398)  2318 (54) 2352 (59) 2340 (55) 2373 (60)
                     
Elasticities           Total hours   Main job   Extra job    
Effect of an increase in hospital wages   0.15* (0.03) 0.23* (0.03) -0.49* (0.09)  
Effect of an increase in private wages    0.10* (0.02) -0.04* (0.01) 1.21* (0.08)  
Effect of an increase in all wages     0.24* (0.03) 0.18* (0.03) 0.68* (0.12)  
N=1521 
Standard deviations in brackets. 
This table corresponds to Table P5 in Appendix 5. 
 
 
Comparing the ‘observed’ hours with the predictions from the model as presented in 
Table 5, I find an under-prediction of hours in the hospital job (2061 hours versus 
2086 hours) and over-prediction of hours in the private practice (257 hours versus 219 
hours), totaling to 13 hours more per year in average. Like the first model the 
prediction of total hours is good, but the predictions of sector mix are biased. As 
expected this group works more in average in both jobs compared to the section 
above. Moving to the policy analysis I find a similar pattern as for the whole group of 
hospital physicians, but higher elasticities.  
 
5.3 Hospital physicians with full dataset in 1995 and 1997 
The next set is an analysis of 1036 hospital physicians with complete NALRA data of 
overtime work observed both in 1995 and 1997. An argument for looking at this 
group is to analyze the same individuals before and after the major wage increase in 
the health sector from 1995 to 1997, when undertaking the experiment in the next 
section.  
 
As presented in Table 3, the income term in the utility function is estimated with a λ  
of 0.93 and an α  of 2.79. The γ  in the leisure component is estimated to - 1.31. Not 
all the variables in the β -function are significant, but the following are: age, number 
of children below six years of age, gender. The older the physician is, the more she 
appreciates leisure, and the same goes for parents with small children and women. 
The hospital specialists appreciate leisure less than the average but this effect is not 




Hospital Physicians with full dataset in 1995 and 1997. 
Observed and Predicted Choices.  Jr. Physicians and Hospital Consultants 
 
       Predictions with   Predictions with   Predictions with 
   Observed   Predicted 10%  increase  in   10% increase in   10% increase in 
     hours    hours   hospital wages  private wages  all wages 
                       
Hours per week    s.d.   s.d.  s.d.  s.d.   s.d.
Hospital   44.4 (5.8)  43.3 (1.5) 44.5 (1.7) 43.1 (1.4)  44.3 (1.7)
Private extra practice  3.6 (5.9)  4.9 (0.9) 4.6 (0.9) 5.6 (1.1)  5.2 (1.0)
Total   48.0 (8.4)  48.2 (2.0) 49.1 (2.2) 48.7 (2.1)  49.5 (2.2)
                     
Hours per year                    
Hospital   2130 (279)  2079 (70) 2136 (83) 2070 (68)  2127 (81)
Private extra practice  174 (283)  234 (43) 219 (41) 267 (52)  251 (49)
Total   2304 (403)  2312 (95) 2355 (103) 2337 (99)  2378 (107)
                       
Elasticities           Total hours   Main job  Extra job      
Effect of an increase in hospital wages   0.19* (0.06) 0.27* (0.06) -0.60* (0.17)   
Effect of an increase in private wages    0.10* (0.03) -0.04* (0.01) 1.41* (0.18)   
Effect of an increase in all wages     0.28* (0.06) 0.23* (0.06) 0.74* (0.27)   
N=1036 
Standard deviations in brackets. 
This table corresponds to Table P6  in Appendix.5. 
 
From Table 6 we see that the hospital physicians have ‘observed’ average annual 
working hours per year of 2130 compared to the prediction of 2079 hours per year. 
The private hours is ‘observed’ with 174 hours and predicted with 234 hours per year. 
The sums are close with 48 hours per week - 2304 hours observed and 2312 hours 
predicted per year. Like the previous models the prediction of total hours is good, but 
the predicted sector mix is deviating from the observed. From Table P6 in Appendix 4 
we observe that common ‘job packages’ with 45.5 or 50 hours per week at the 
hospital and no private income is under-predicted.  
 
The next step is the policy analysis with a 10 percent wage increase at the hospital 
job, keeping private ‘wages’ constant. The prediction is an increase of 3 percent 
increase in the hospital hours, or 57 hours per year. The private hours is predicted to 
have a reduction of six percent or 15 hours per year. The total is an increase of 43 
hours or 2 percent. Like in section 5.1 the opposite effect is occurring with a 10 
percent ‘wage-‘ (fee) increase in private practice. An average of 9 hours per year less 
in the hospital job or two percent reduction in hospital hours and 33 hours or 14 
percent increase in private practice hours, corresponding to a one percent increase in 
total hours.  
 
With a 10 percent wage increase in both sectors, the model predicts a mean increase 
in labor supply of 66 hours per year, where the hospital job absorbs 48 hours of the 
increase. Looking at changes in total hours from an increase in the hospital wage, I 
find a wage elasticity of 0.19. The sector specific elasticities are 0.27 in the hospital 
job and -0.60 in the private practice. The wage elasticity when increasing the private 
wages is 0.10 for total working hours, -0.04 in the hospital job and 1.41 in the private 
practice. With an increase in both wages the elasticity is 0.28, 0.23 at the hospital and 
0.74 in the private practice. In all policy simulations the total change in hours worked 
is small, with wage elasticities from 0.1 to 0.3.  
  
 5.4 Predictions based on 1997 data 
In this section I present an ‘experiment’ applying the models in 5.1-5.3 based on 1995 
data to predict the labor supply in 1997. I use the ‘observed’ hourly wages in 1997, in 21 
the meaning of the calculated wages based on income and available data on hours. 
Combining these wages with parameters estimated on 1995 data, gives an opportunity 
to evaluate the reliability of the predictions by comparing the predicted choices with 
the observed. Table 7 displays the three subsets of hospital physicians with private 
extra practice presented in the sections above.  
 
Table 7 Prediction Experiment on 1997 Data 
Observed Choices in 1997 and Predicted Choices in 1997.  
Predictions based on 1995 Model Parameters and 1997 Wages.  
Hospital Physicians 
   All Hospital Physicians  Male Hospital Consultants  observed in 1995 & 1997 
N=1553  N=790 N=1036
Predicted with    Predicted with    Predicted with 
     Observed 1997  1997 wages      Observed 1997  1997 wages      Observed 1997  1997 wages  
      
Hours per week    s.d.  s.d. s.d. s.d. s.d. s.d. 
Hospital   43.4  (-7.1)  42.7  (-1.2) 45 (-6.8) 44.1 (-0.8) 43.7 (-6.5) 42.7  (-1.2) 
Private extra practice     3.6  (-5.9)  5.5  (-1.3)   4 (-6.2) 6.2 (-0.9)   3.2 (-5.5) 5.5  (-1.3) 
Total   47  (-9.1)  48.2  (-2.3) 49 (-9) 50.3 (-1.2) 46.9 (-8.6) 48.2  (-2.3) 
Hours per year   
Hospital   2082  (-342)  2049  (-59) 2160 (-326) 2116 (-40) 2096 (-310) 2049  (-59) 
Private extra practice     171  (-285)  266  (-60)   194 (-299) 298 (-44)   156 (-266) 266  (-60) 
Total   2254  (-435)  2315  (-110) 2354 (-432) 2414 (-55) 2252 (-411) 2315  (-110) 
Standard deviations in brackets. This table corresponds to Table P7 in Appendix 5. 
 
I find that the predictions overestimate the total hours in all alternatives, with up to 
three percent. In all samples, the average labor supply at hospitals are underestimated, 
whereas the private extra job is overestimated.  
 
In the first set the predicted average hours in the hospital job is 2049 compared to 
2082 hours per year observed. In the private practice, the model predicts 266 hours 
per year compared to our calculated 171. The total hours predicted for hospital 
consultants are 2414 compared to the 2354 hours observed per year. The private hours 
are also here significantly above those calculated based on survey data. For the group 
observed with a complete dataset in both years the prediction is 2049 hours per year 
in the hospital job and 266 in private practice, compared to the 2096 and 156 
‘observed’. The predicted total hours are thus 63 above the ‘observed’, corresponding 
to almost 3 percent. The largest deviation between predicted and observed is in the 
sample with the same individuals applied to estimate the parameters utilized in the 
predictions.  
 
The predictions of total hours are fairly in the region of the observed choices, and the 
predictions have the correct direction of changes in the hospital hours from 1995 to 
1997 when comparing Table 7 to Tables 4-6. The private hours are over predicted but 
the predicted direction is correct.  
 
 
5.5 Changes in observed hours from 1995 to 1997.  
In the light of the major increase in the hospital wages from 1995 to 1997 it is also 
interesting just to look at the changes in observed hours. The focus here will be on the 
hospital hours, observed with a complete dataset before and after the hospital pay 
reform. Table 8 reports two measures on hourly wages, a basic wage before 
compensations and benefits, and the mean of total income divided by total hours. We 22 
know that the marginal wage when working overtime is three times the wage of the 
first hour. This wage equals what I have called the basic wage, supplemented with 
compensations for shift work and some other benefits. The mean basic wage was 
around NOK 150 in 1995 increasing with 12-14 percent the next two years after 
correcting for price increases. The total income divided by all hours gives a mean 
hourly wage of NOK 210-230 in 1995, increasing around 35 percent in 1997 due to 
changes in the payment structure for overtime work.  
 
During the same period there is a small reduction in the mean hours worked, from 
2130 hours per year to 2096 for the individuals with a complete dataset prior to and 
after the pay reform. This equals a reduction from 44.4 to 43.7 hours per week. Some 
specialists like anaesthetists typically work 48 hours per week, others no more than 
the general contract of 37.5 hours per week. In a period with a significant wage 
increase we thus observe a small reduction in hours worked. This result may be due to 
a strong income effect, or institutional mechanisms reducing physicians overtime in 
order to keep the budget in spite of a marked wage increase. For the two first subsets 





Changes in observed hours and mean hourly wages. Hospital physicians 1995-1997.  
 N  Hospital  hours  Basic hourly wage    Income/Hours 
   1995 1997  1995 1997 Change  1995 1997 Change   1995  1997 Change
      
Hospital physicians  2775 1553 2032 2082 2 % 146 166 12 %  211  278  33 %
  (298)(342) (17.0)(14.6)  (36.5)  (40.6) 
Male consultants  1521 790 2086 2160 4 % 151 171 14 %  228  308  35 %
  (295)(326) (14.1) (9.5)  (28.7)  (23.8) 
Hospital physicians obs. In 95-97  1036 1036  2130 2096 -2 %  150 169 12 %   214  291  36 %
  (279)(310) (16.4)(12.4)  (36.5)  (36.9) 
1995 prices 
 
The private hours are less reliable but are included in Figure 4 in Appendix 4. In all 
the sets of hospital physicians there is a reduction in private work. My calculations 
indicate a reduction in the extra job, with an average of about 20 hours per year. The 
direction of this change seems reasonable given the major increase in hospital wages, 
making it relatively more profitable to continue at the hospital instead of moving to a 
private practice. The size of the effect is however uncertain.   23 
Table 9 All physicians in 1997. Observed and Predicted Choices.   
 
                   
      Predictions with   Predictions with   Predictions with   Predictions with   Predictions with 
    Observed   Predicted choice  10% increase in   10% increase in   10% increase in   10% increase in   10% increase in  
     share        hospital wages primary  care wages private wages other wages all wages 
                          
Hours per week     s.d.  s.d.  s.d.  s.d.  s.d.  s.d.
Main     40.7  10.5 39.5 (4.7) 40.5 (5.4) 39.6  (4.6) 39.3 (4.3) 39.4 (4.7) 40.5 (4.9)
Extra        7.6  7.3 9.1 (1.4) 8.7 (1.6) 9.1  (1.4) 9.5 (1.6) 9.3 (1.4) 9.2 (1.5)
Total     48.3  11.7 48.6 (4.1) 49.2 (4.5) 48.7  (4.0) 48.9 (3.9) 48.7 (4.0) 49.7 (4.2)
                                
Hours per year                           
Main     1953  503 1895 (225) 1946 (260) 1900  (222) 1888 (208) 1893 (224) 1945 (235)
Extra        365  351 439 (68) 417 (77) 436  (66) 458 (77) 446 (67) 440 (74)
Total     2319  561 2333 (195) 2363 (215) 2336  (194) 2347 (187) 2338 (191) 2385 (200)
                          
                          
Elasticities     Total hours  Main job     Extra job                  
Wage increase in     s.d.  s.d.  s.d.         
Hospitals     0.12 (0.11) 0.25 (0.23) -0.51 (0.47 )        
Primary care    0.01 (0.05) 0.03 (0.11) -0.04 (0.16))         
Private practice    0.06 (0.07) -0.02 (0.22) 0.45 (0.63)         
Other jobs      0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.09) 0.17 (0.31)         
All sectors        0.22* (0.04) 0.26* (0.06) 0.01 (0.15)         
Standard deviation in brackets. 
                  
This table corresponds to Table P9 in Appendix 5.  24 
5.6 All physicians practicing in 1997 
Expanding the sample to include all physicians practicing in 1997 gives an 
opportunity to analyze the impact on all sectors of changes in sector specific wages. 
The physicians have a job choice between five sectors as described by Table A8. 55 
percent of the physicians have a main job in the hospital sector, 31 percent as private 
practitioners, 7 percent as municipal health officers and the remaining 6 percent in 
other jobs like health administration and research. The extra job is restricted to private 
practice, the most common choice observed. The exception is private practitioners 
with other as their extra job. As before, the working hours are set to zero if they do 
not work in an extra job.  
 
The parameter estimation, as presented in Table 3, gives an income term in the utility 
function with a λ  of 0.59 and an α  of 3.45. The γ  in the leisure component is 
estimated to –3.72.  The older the physician is, the more she appreciates leisure, and 
the same goes for parents with small children, if the spouse do not work, if you have a 
non-Norwegian country background and if you are a woman. The g-function is 
estimated with a dummy for fulltime work and a dummy for private practitioners.  
 
From Table 9 we see that the physicians have an ‘observed’ average of 1953 working 
hours per year in their main job, compared to the prediction of 1895 hours per year. 
The more uncertain estimate of the extra job is ‘observed’ with 365 hours and 
predicted with 439 hours per year. The sums are close with 2319 hours ‘observed’ and 
2333 hours predicted per year. This sample has less precise predictions than the three 
subsets of hospital physicians, but the prediction of total hours is better than the 
predictions for the main job and the second job. The total working hours corresponds 
to 48 hours per week. The amount of hours in the extra job is higher than in the 
previous samples for hospital physicians. This is not only due to the inclusion of other 
sectors, but also that private practitioners with a public contract receive income from 
several sources. As I have not been able to aggregate these sources in this set, I 
register the block grant from the municipality as an extra job.  
 
In the policy analysis, the prediction effect of an 10 percent increase in hospital 
wages, is an increase of 3 percent in the hospital hours, or 51 hours per year. The 
private hours are predicted to have a reduction of five percent or 22 hours per year. 
The total is an increase of 30 hours or one percent. A ten percent increase in wages in 
public primary care has small effects on the mean working hours for all physicians, 
partly due to their limited share of the total population also after a simulated wage 
increase. A ten percent wage increase results in a mean of 5 hours more worked in the 
main job, and 3 hours less in the extra job.   
 
A 10 percent ‘wage-‘ (fee) increase in private practice, reduces the hours in the main 
job for those working private practice as their extra job, and increases the hours for 
those working private in their main job. The result is a minimal predicted change of 7 
hours less per year in the main job. There is a 4 percent increase in the hours in the 
extra job, driven by the hospital physicians with a second job in private practice. A 
similar policy experiment with an increase in other wages, predicts no major change 
in the main job, and a 1.5 percent increase in extra job hours. 
 
If all wages are raised with 10 percent, there is a mean increase of 50 hours per year 
in the main job and no change in the extra job. The wage elasticity in this case is  0.22 25 
and significantly different from zero. As reported in Table 9 the elasticities for all the 
other policy experiments are small and positive, but not significant. 
 
5.7 Discussions 
The previous sections have presented three samples of hospital physicians and one 
complete set of all physicians working in Norway. The reason for the focus on 
hospital physicians is the superiority of the data on working time compared to the 
other sectors. It is important to remember that this discrete choice application only is 
an approximation with 9 alternative hours in the main job and five alternatives when 
having a side job. 
 
The observed and predicted choice of hours in their main job and extra job is 
presented in Figure 1 - Figure 3 in Appendix 4. The first bar to the left represents 
hours worked in 1995. The second is predicted hours with unchanged wages. The 
third represents a prediction of hours with a 10 percent increase in hospital wages. 
The two following bars represent similar policy experiments in private practice and 
for all sectors simultaneously. The two bars to the right represent observations in 1997 
and predictions for 1997 in a policy experiment where I use the parameters estimated 
on 1995 data and the ‘observed’ wages from 1997 to predict the choices in 1997.  
 
In all applications I find a modest response in the total hours worked from a wage 
increase in hospitals. The model predicts that the hospital physicians respond to a 
wage raise by increasing the hours at the hospital, and reducing their private hours. 
The opposite goes for an increase in the private practice fees. A similar pattern repeats 
in all samples of the model. The predictions are reasonable adequate, with a general 
tendency that the hours worked at the hospital are lightly under-predicted, whereas the 
private hours are over-predicted. When increasing the hospital wages alone the 
‘hospital specific’ elasticity ranged from 0.16 to 0.27. Focusing at the total hours 
worked, the elasticities ranged from 0.10 to 0.19. When simulating an increase in all 
wages the elasticities are higher, ranging from 0.18 to 0.28. 
 
Compared to the high quality of the data for hospital physicians, the hours in private 
sector must be seen as an approximation to the unobserved working hours. As 
presented in each table the effect on total labor supply of a wage increase is small.  
The wage elasticities, total and by sector, are presented in each table. There are no 
major deviations from this results related to gender, specialty and geographic region 
found in predictions not presented here. Of course, with such small behavioral 
responses predicted it is difficult to identify any differences. A reason for the lack of 
gender differences is probably that female hospital physicians choose to work, or are 
‘forced’ to work, in the same shift plan as male physicians. A preference for shorter 
working hours would thus lead to a job choice in another sector like the health 
administration, as a municipal health officer/public primary care physician or a part-
time private practice, where we do not have access to data of the same detail as the 
NALRA data. The regional similarities are probably due to the centralized wage 
determination in the health sector, with almost identical wages and fees trough out the 
country.  
  
This section also presented an ‘experiment’ on the hospital physicians – predicting 
choices in 1997 using the parameter estimates from 1995 and the ‘observed’ wages 
from 1997. Whereas the predictions of total hours are in the region of the observed 26 
choices, the predictions only have the correct direction of changes in the hospital 
hours in two of the three cases. The private hours are overpredicted and the observed 




The aim of this paper has been to identify the effect of increased wages on working 
hours and sector choice. I find a modest wage elasticity for the physicians in our study 
when focusing on the total hours worked. This remains for the three sub-samples of 
employed hospital physicians, studied in detail due to their superiority in data quality. 
The predictions indicate, however, that the ‘job specific’ elasticities are higher, and 
that the effect on total hours are dampened by a change in the sector mix. Looking at 
the hospital physicians, a wage increase results in an increase in the hours worked at 
the hospital. The total effect is dampened by a reduction in the hours in the extra 
private practice. The opposite occur with an increase in the private wages or fees – an 
increase in hours in private practice and a reduction of hours at the hospital. A parallel 
pattern repeats in all sectors.  
 
Due to the limited time period presented here, I am not able to document changes in 
specialization choice as a response to the significant wage increase in hospital sector 
utilized in this study. This is an interesting issue for further research, but requires data 
from a long time period as it takes 5-15 years from completing the university studies 
to the licensing as a specialist. The general tendency presented in anecdotal evidence, 
is that the physicians’ preferences are changing towards shorter working hours and 
more leisure, and that the rapidly increasing share of female physicians is 
strengthening this trend. The Norwegian response to the increasing need for 
personnel, fueled by intensified specialization and institutional reforms, has been an 
increase in the educational capacity and an import of foreign personnel. The results 
presented in this paper indicate that the alternative of increasing the hours worked for 
those already participating by increasing wages would be demanding on public 
budgets.  
 
In a policy perspective, this analysis predicts a modest response in total hours worked 
to a wage increase. The results are in line with the existing research on employed 
physicians and the more general literature on high-income professionals. A high-
income group with full participation and many hours worked per year is not 
responsive to increased wages in their total labor supply. However, there might be a 
potential in influencing the choice of sector mix as documented by this study. 27 
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Appendix 1   Summary statistics  
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Some of the individuals were dropped due to missing data .  
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Table A2 More restrictive data set used as a basis for the hospital analysis.  
Data used in section 5.1-5.4 
Variable      Label                                              Mean  Std Dev 
      
b970_5        No. of children below 6 years of age       0.47 0.68
ektejobb      Spouse do not work:  1=yes 0=No            0.31 0.46
ektelege      Spouse is physician: 1=Yes 0=No            0.19 0.39
ektespl       Spouse is Registred nurse: 1=Yes 0=No      0.17 0.38
cnorway       From Norway                              0.83 0.38
female        Female                                     0.26 0.44
married       Married                                    0.78 0.41
age           Age                                        46.3 8.85
nonw          Nonwage income – spouse, capital, etc.     208000 167000
rek           Specialty with extra pay in hospitals      0.13 0.34
duma          Dummy if hospital                          0.49 0.5
dumb          Dummy if private                           0.32 0.46
dumc          Dummy for pai info                         0.37 0.48
paitid        Pai info  - more restrictive               0.31 0.46
ubehagd       Pai info – more complete                   0.26 0.44
nonspes       Not qualified specialist                   0.28 0.45
s_gp          Specialist GP/Primary Care Medicine        0.23 0.42
s_non_gp      Specialist   (Except in GP/PCM)            0.49 0.5
s_surg        Spec.Surgery                               0.14 0.35
s_int_me      Spec.Internal Medicine                     0.2 0.4
s_psych       Spec.Psychiatry                            0.07 0.26
s_lab         Spec.Laboratory Medicine                   0.06 0.23
      
SECTORS      
Sector main job - dummies          
s_1       KS – Hospitals out of Oslo                       0.35 0.48
s_2       OS – Oslo hospitals                            0.14 0.35
s_3       Municipal primary care                         0.09 0.28
s_4       Private without public contract                0.1 0.31
s_5       Other                                          0.05 0.22
s_6       Research and development                       0.05 0.23
s_7       Private with public contract                   0.21 0.41
Alternative sector allocation     
sm1       Hospitals                                      0.49 0.5
sm2       Private practice                               0.32 0.46
sm3       Other                                          0.19 0.39
      
Extra job       
b_1    Hospital , no extra job                           0.28 0.45
b_2    Hospital , with extra wage                        0.12 0.32
b_3    Hospital , with extra non wage job                0.09 0.28
b_4    Private, no extra job                             0.24 0.42
b_5    Private with extra job                            0.08 0.27
b_6    Other, no extra job                               0.07 0.26
b_7    Other, with extra job                             0.12 0.33
      
HOURS      
HOURS MAIN JOB 4 alternatives     
h_m1    Part time <17.5 hours per week                   0.07 0.25
h_m2    Part time <35 hours per week                     0.08 0.28
h_m3    Full time                                        0.62 0.48
h_m4    Full time -extended hours >38 hours per week     0.22 0.42
Extra job - hours     
h_b1      0  (hours <1)                                  0.59 0.49
h_b2      1<hours<7*48                                   0.16 0.37
h_b3      Hours >7*48                                    0.24 0.43
N=8718 31 
Table A3 Summary statistics  
All Physicians in 1997 (After trimming). Data used in section 5.5 
Variable     Mean Std Dev
rekr9697  Specialist recruitment pay  0.12 0.33
kapinnt97 Capital  income  49400 155000
overf97 Transfers  10100 25700
b970_5  Children < 6 years  0.54 0.71
statsp97 Savings  4200 22600
eies97  Spouse's income after tax  158000 156000
Nonw Non  wage  income  208000 199800
Ektejobb  Spouse do not work=1  0.35 0.48
Ektelege  Spouse is physician=1  0.19 0.39
Ektespl  Spouse is nurse=1  0.16 0.37
Cnorway  Born in Norway=1  0.81 0.40
Female Female  0.29 0.45
Married Married  0.76 0.43
Age Age  45.0 9.1
  Age - Hospital outside of Oslo  44.3
  Age - Hospitals in Oslo  44.9
  Age - Public Primary care  42.8
  Age - Private practice  46.3
  Age - Other  45.6
S_1  Hospital outside of Oslo  0.35 0.48
S_2  Hospitals in Oslo  0.20 0.40
S_3  Public Primary care  0.07 0.25
S_4 Private  practice  0.31 0.46
S_5 Other  0.06 0.24
we1  Wage per hour - S_1  242.8 34.5
we2  Wage per hour - S_2  218.9 37.1
we3  Wage per hour - S_3  199.3 20.9
we4  Wage per hour - S_4  265.0 46.9
we5  Wage per hour - S_5  191.1 30.7
h_b1  Hours extra job 1    0 h/w 0.30 0.46
h_b2  Hours extra job 2    6 h/w   0.39 0.49
h_b3  Hours extra job 3  12 h/w 0.14 0.35
h_b4  Hours extra job 4  18 h/w 0.08 0.27
h_b5  Hours extra job 5  24 h/w 0.09 0.28
h_m1  Hours main job 1  18 h/w 0.03 0.18
h_m2  Hours main job 2  22 h/w 0.03 0.18
h_m3  Hours main job 3  28 h/w 0.23 0.42
h_m4  Hours main job 4  35.5 h/w 0.03 0.17
h_m5  Hours main job 5  37.5 h/w 0.01 0.10
h_m6  Hours main job 6  40.5 h/w 0.13 0.34
h_m7  Hours main job 7  45.5 h/w 0.10 0.30
h_m8  Hours main job 8  50  h/w 0.42 0.49
h_m9  Hours main job 9  55 h/w 0.01 0.10
N=9528      
Note that this is the sample after trimming. The allocation between sectors in this dataset is somewhat different than in 
table A3 which provides an attempt to separate private practice with and without public funding. This dataset is not 
provided with such contract information.  
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Appendix 2    Hourly wages 
 
Annual income by sector 
I have constructed sector-specific hourly wages for all physicians, including sectors 
where they not are participating. The first step in this process is to sort the jobs by the 
NACE standard industrial classification (supplemented with SAMDATA and NALRA 
hospital codes), and aggregate into sectors or job types. As described in table A3 I 
have choosen to use seven ‘sectors’ when I construct hourly wages:  a) Local hospitals 
outside of Oslo, b) Oslo hospitals, c) Municipal Medical Officer/Public Primary Care, 
d) Private practice with a municipal contract, e) Private practice without a municipal 
contract, f) Medical research in Universities or Pharmaceutical Companies and g) 
Other work like in the central health authorities, NGOs etc.  
 
Private nonwage income is allocated to private sector as well as wage income from 
private-for-profit health providers. The physicians are allocated to public jobs in 
hospitals and primary care if their working hours indicate that they work more hours in 
their public job than in their private practice. Otherwise the main job is the one with 
highest annual earnings. In the analysis I have aggregated the sectors to five: Local 
hospitals, Oslo hospitals, Municipal Medical Officer, Private practice, Other (S_1-
S_5). For comparisons I have also used the alternative with three sectors:  Hospitals, 
Private practice, Other (SZ_1-SZ_3).   
 
I had to simplify the choice set of extra work and introduce the following rules:  
•  If you work at a hospital your extra job is private 
•  If you work at a in public primary care your extra job is private 
•  If you work private your extra job is other 
•  If you work in other your extra job is private 
 
Hours 
The most challenging task is to find the number of hours worked per year. I have used 
the best avaliable data in each sector, but their quality is very variable as described in 
section 4. For the NALRA hospitals this gives accurate observations, whereas we have 
reasonable good institutional knowledge for the other employees too.  
 
Hourly wages in hospitals 
Utilising the detailed NALRA data, I am able to observe the hourly wage dependent 
on hours worked. This is important, as the marginal wage for a hospital consultant is 
up to 200 percent higher when considering working an extra hour at the hospital or to 
continue at the private practice, compared to the moderate hourly wage the hospital 
consultants earn during their first 35.5 hours per week. I model the contract almost 
exact, based upon a basic wage, which I estimate in the cases they are not observable. 
The Oslo hospitals have the same wage structure as the rest of the country, but the 
basic wage is about 3 percent higher higher.  
 
Hourly wages in private practice 
For the self-employed we only have access to the group average of income and hours 
per year from a survey by Statistics Norway (1995 and 1998). I used this survey to 
calculate an average hourly wage for the general practitioners and for the private 
specialists. I then approximated the hours worked based on their reported income. An 
argument in defence of this practice is that all physicians with a public contract face 33 
the same financing scheme. Private practitioners without such contracts will however 
have a greater variations in hourly wages. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some 
specialities the hourly wage may be considerably larger than the average reported in 
the survey. This is unobservable in our data.  
 
Weeks per year 
I assume that all physicians work 48 weeks per year, utilizing their 4 weeks of paid 
holiday. For a standard job in public administration this equals 1,800 hours per year.  
 
Experience 
In many empirical studies, a labor market experience is proxied by potential 
experience, i.e. age-education-7. This is a problematic upper bound for experience 
which is more upward biased for women which tend to have a looser connection to the 
labor market, alt least in connection with maternity leaves. Female physicians, 
however, generally work more hours per week than women in other professions and 
part time is not by far as common as for e.g. nurses. On the other hand, female 
physicians have the highest fertility rate of all educational groups in Norway, 
qualifying for one-year maternity leave per birth.  
 
The first of our measures of experience, years since date of authorization, are troubled 
with some of these difficulties, but at least just related to the period after completion of 
internship. The other measure is constructed on earnings histories available from the 
Norwegian National Insurance Scheme, which was established in 1967. Individual 
‘pension entitlements’ in this scheme are linked to their income histories.  There are 
small differences between the alternatives, but after testing I choose to use the measure 
based on ‘pension entitlements’.  
 
Selection bias 
Intuitively there is reason to believe that there is a selection into the different sectors 
driven by unobserved factors like preferences and productivity. When I estimate 
hourly wages for each individual, also in sectors where they do not work, I should take 
this selection into consideration. In practice there seems be no major differences 
between the hourly wages predicted by OLS and a Heckman two-step procedure. An 
effect is revealed in the hospital sector, but for reasons of comparisons, OLS is 
preferred. The wage regressions for 1995 are presented in table A4 and table A5. The 
regressions from 1997 are similar and not presented here. 34 
Table A4 Wage Relation 1995 
     Public Public    Private  Private  Universities  Other 
    hospitals Primary  practice  practice  R & D  jobs 
    Basic wage Care  w/o public  w/ public      
OLS        Basic wage contract  contract       
Female Female=1  -0.0121 -0.0319 -0.0821 -0.1183 -0.0410  -0.1236
   (0.0032) (0.0067) (0.0331) (0.0239) (0.0220)  (0.0345)
Nonspes  Not registered specialist=1   -0.0750 -0.0247 -0.0750 0.0366 0.0656  0.1440
   (0.0042) (0.0089) (0.0330) (0.0244) (0.0228)  (0.0452)
s_surg Specialist  in surgery=1  -0.0037 0.0162 0.0510 0.0311 -0.0388  0.2324
   (0.0033) (0.0366) (0.0477) (0.1138) (0.0365)  (0.0667)
s_prim 
Specialist in primary care 
medicine=1  -0.0394 0.0163 -0.0741 0.1011 -0.0665  0.0312
   (0.0058) (0.0093) (0.0293) (0.0266) (0.0444)  (0.0567)
s_social 
Specialist in social medicine/public 
health=1  -0.0119 0.0387 0.1441 0.1458 0.1158  0.2792
   (0.0150) (0.0154) (0.1134) (0.0786) (0.0408)  (0.0485)
s_psych  Specialist in psychiatri=1  0.0164 0.0153 -0.0758 0.1030 -0.0363  0.0242
   (0.0045) (0.0419) (0.0551) (0.0602) (0.0392)  (0.0656)
s_lab  Specialist in laboratory medicine=1  0.0123 -0.0102 0.0943(dropped) 0.1276  0.0859
   (0.0049) (0.0511) (0.1529) (0.0294)  (0.1138)
Regionb  Geographical region B =1  0.0000 -0.0253 0.0333 0.0703 0.0112  -0.0969
  East except Oslo/Akershus  (0.0057) (0.0154) (0.0450) (0.0285) (0.0578)  (0.0627)
Regionc  Geographical region C =1  0.0115 -0.0055 0.0956 0.1269 -0.2278  0.0373
  West (0.0051) (0.0148) (0.0430) (0.0294) (0.1296)  (0.0529)
Regiond  Geographical region D =1  0.0017 -0.0009 0.0235 0.1016 -0.0270  0.0744
  Middle (0.0049) (0.0135) (0.0441) (0.0310) (0.0224)  (0.0489)
Regione  Geographical region E =1  0.0253 -0.0139 0.0960 0.0732 -0.0479  0.0473
  North (0.0048) (0.0144) (0.0389) (0.0321) (0.0204)  (0.0529)
Age Age  -0.1521 0.1896 0.8869 0.6346 0.0364  1.9380
   (0.0680) (0.1745) (0.8466) (0.5769) (0.4585)  (1.0886)
age2 Age  squared/10  0.6106 -0.5437 -3.0331 -1.7766 -0.1830  -6.3723
   (0.2293) (0.5965) (2.7684) (1.9298) (1.4994)  (3.6865)
age3 Age^3/1000  -0.9815 0.6949 4.5466 2.1201 0.4259  9.3188
   (0.3381) (0.8924) (3.9726) (2.8346) (2.1447)  (5.4645)
age4 Age^4/100000  0.5598 -0.3346 -2.5333 -0.9110 -0.3289  -5.0985
   (0.1842) (0.4935) (2.1133) (1.5441) (1.1347)  (2.9940)
AgeAFP  If age >=62 years then =1  -0.0214 0.0308 0.2157 -0.0869 0.0526  0.3469
  Qualify for early retirement  (0.0132) (0.0511) (0.1340) (0.1364) (0.0648)  (0.1874)
erf95 
Years of Work Experience  last 20 
years  0.0114 0.0067 0.0705 0.1192 0.1163  0.0418
   (0.0100) (0.0182) (0.1192) (0.0840) (0.1691)  (0.1911)
erf952 Experience^2/10  -0.1905 0.0742 -0.8405 -2.5934 -2.2459  -0.7048
   (0.1633) (0.3057) (1.9384) (1.3299) (2.3547)  (2.7971)
erf953 Experience^3/1000  1.4876 -1.1418 4.9185 17.7870 15.8168 4.7878
   (1.0414) (2.0238) (12.0914) (8.1977) (13.3914)  (16.6350)
erf954 Experience^4/100000  -3.7024 3.6146 -9.7911 -38.4166 -35.4875  -10.1518
   (2.2689) (4.5491) (25.7079) (17.2955) (26.7688)  (34.5831)
Cnordic 
From Nordic Country except 
Norway=1  0.0083 0.0173 0.1105 -0.0249 -0.0563  -0.0621
   (0.0063) (0.0150) (0.0590) (0.0421) (0.0439)  (0.0762)
coecd_no 
From OECD Area except the Nordic 
Countries=1  -0.0048 -0.0017 0.0338 -0.0151 -0.0329  -0.0241
   (0.0056) (0.0123) (0.0501) (0.0403) (0.0457)  (0.0533)
Cglobal Non-OECD  Background=1  -0.0060 -0.0332 -0.0717 -0.0095 -0.0182  -0.0577
   (0.0067) (0.0135) (0.0811) (0.0455) (0.0512)  (0.0912)
Married Married=1  0.0111 -0.0141 -0.0074 0.0249 0.0126  0.0156
   (0.0032) (0.0076) (0.0327) (0.0239) (0.0201)  (0.0336)
b950_5  No. Of Children Aged 0-5  -0.0035 -0.0130 -0.0140 -0.0047 -0.0088  -0.0220
   (0.0020) (0.0041) (0.0220) (0.0148) (0.0134)  (0.0212)
kommsen1  Centrality index 1 =1   0.0183 0.0152 -0.0376 -0.0023 0.0198  0.0012
   (0.0069) (0.0088) (0.0709) (0.0376) (0.1028)  (0.0684)
kommsen2  Centrality index 2 =1   0.0174 0.0177 -0.1399 -0.0024 (dropped)  -0.0203
   (0.0058) (0.0140) (0.0963) (0.0553)   (0.0988)
kommsen3  Centrality index 3 =1   0.0000 0.0126 0.0481 -0.0280 -0.0276  -0.1055
   (0.0045) (0.0117) (0.0707) (0.0334) (0.1233)  (0.0807)
kommsen4  Centrality index 4 =1   -0.0055 0.0002 -0.1090 -0.0236 (dropped)  -0.1024
   (0.0153) (0.0130) (0.0899) (0.0551)   (0.1074)
kommsen5  Centrality index 5 =1   -0.0003 -0.0546 0.0091 -0.0358 (dropped)  -0.2751
   (0.0086) (0.0218) (0.0779) (0.0427)   (0.1198)
kommsen6  Centrality index 6 =1   0.0058 0.0027 -0.0680 -0.0483 0.1169  0.0227
 
Centrality index 7 = reference (most 
central) (0.0046) (0.0133) (0.0432) (0.0275) (0.0725)  (0.0640)
Constant   6.0794 2.4814 -4.2482 -2.7055 4.3360  -17.1348
   (0.7441) (1.8796) (9.6029) (6.3916) (5.2087)  (11.9178)
R2 adjusted    0.5873 0.4446 0.0591 0.0766 0.4402  0.3404
Number of obs.    3636 570 770 1192 459  331
Dependent variable is log of hourly wage. Standard errors in parenthesis.  35 
Table A5 Heckman selection correction as an alternative to OLS 
Log basic wage per hour in the hospital sector 
              
      Coef. Std. Err.  z 
Female Female=1  -0.0104 0.0035  -2.97 
Regionb  East except Oslo/Akershus  -0.0008 0.005  -0.17 
Regionc West  0.0029 0.0056  0.53 
Regiond Middle  -0.0014 0.0051  -0.28 
Regione North  0.0199 0.0051  3.91 
Nonspes  Not registered specialist=1   -0.0994 0.0044  -22.72 
s_surg Specialist  in surgery=1  -0.0037 0.0037  -1.02 
s_prim  Specialist in primary care medicine=1  -0.0384 0.0063  -6.1 
s_social  Specialist in social medicine/public health=1  -0.015 0.0166  -0.9 
s_psych  Specialist in psychiatri=1  0.0242 0.005  4.83 
s_lab  Specialist in laboratory medicine=1  0.0114 0.0054  2.12 
erf95  Years of Work Experience  last 20 years  -0.0267 0.0107  -2.51 
erf952 Experience^2/10  0.3803 0.1724  2.21 
erf953 Experience^3/1000  -1.6976 1.0978  -1.55 
erf954 Experience^4/100000  2.876 2.3881  1.2 
Constant   4.968 0.0228  218.21 
        
Selection correction       
Female Female=1  -0.2013 0.064  -3.15 
Regionb  East except Oslo/Akershus  0.4422 0.1086  4.07 
Regionc West  0.7033 0.1049  6.71 
Regiond Middle  0.2221 0.0852  2.61 
Regione North  0.3698 0.0866  4.27 
Cnordic  From Nordic Country except Norway=1  -0.0336 0.1134  -0.3 
coecd_no  From OECD Area except the Nordic Countries=1  0.0081 0.1117  0.07 
Cglobal Non-OECD  Background=1  -0.0559 0.1288  -0.43 
Nonspes  Not registered specialist=1   0.1902 0.0874  2.18 
s_surg Specialist  in surgery=1  0.1043 0.0707  1.48 
s_prim  Specialist in primary care medicine=1  0.1571 0.1282  1.23 
s_social  Specialist in social medicine/public health=1  0.3516 0.3714  0.95 
s_psych  Specialist in psychiatri=1  -0.0548 0.0892  -0.62 
s_lab  Specialist in laboratory medicine=1  0.1949 0.1091  1.79 
erf95  Years of Work Experience  last 20 years  0.2577 0.1957  1.32 
erf952 Experience^2/10  -3.862 3.2166  -1.2 
erf953 Experience^3/1000  22.7395 20.6823  1.1 
erf954 Experience^4/100000  -49.2674 45.3462  -1.09 
Age Age  -2.6499 1.3505  -1.96 
age2 Age^2/10  9.2902 4.5359  2.05 
age3 Age^3/1000  -13.8651 6.6622  -2.08 
age4 Age^4/100000  7.546 3.6169  2.09 
AgeAFP  If age >=62 years then =1  -0.4121 0.2563  -1.61 
Married Married=1  -0.0355 0.0638  -0.56 
b950_5  No. Of Children Aged 0-5  -0.0076 0.0398  -0.19 
kommsen1  Centrality index 1 =1   0.2741 0.1429  1.92 
kommsen2  Centrality index 2 =1   0.7319 0.1586  4.61 
kommsen3  Centrality index 3 =1   0.4864 0.1091  4.46 
kommsen4  Centrality index 4 =1   -0.3676 0.2455  -1.5 
kommsen5  Centrality index 5 =1   0.1217 0.1877  0.65 
kommsen6  Centrality index 6 =1   0.0752 0.0982  0.77 
Constant   27.2178 14.8384  1.83 
        
/athrho   -0.7242 0.0978  -7.4 
/lnsigma   -2.4537 0.0172  -142.26 
Rho   -0.6195 0.0603  
Sigma   0.086 0.0015  
Log likelihood     2638.6    
Number of obs.  4086      
Table A4 Heckman selection correction as an alternative to OLS    
 
 
Table A6 A comparison of log basic wage per hour in the hospital sector.  
 Obs  Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max 
OLS  3636 4.98 0.09 4.73 5.13 
Heckman  3636 4.99 0.09 4.77 5.10 
The basic wage is supplemented by compensations for shift work, extended hours and personal benefits. A 
compensation of 50%, 100% or 200% is added to the salary when working overtime.  36 
  
Table A7 Observed wage per hour by sector. Predicted if missing. 1995. 
Sector Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Basic wage – Hospital  new1 144.0 13.7
Hospitals   nwz1 210.4 36.7
Private w/o public contract  new4 274.1 45.1
Private w/o public contract  new7 268.6 41.3
Basic wage – Primary Care  new3 148.1 8.8
Universities, R&D  new6 154.7 26.9
Other  new5 190.4 37.4
N=9874 
nwe1 and nwe3 are the basic salaries prior to a set of compensational benefits. I apply the exact compensation scheme. The other 
variables are total earnings divided by the estimated number of hours per year. The private sector categories are merged in the 













Table A9 Tax rules applied in 1995 
(Married class G4 and G5 and working singles) 
Income = Y  Tax 
0 – 20 954  0 
20 954 – 143 500  0.302Y – 6 328 
143 500 – 212 000  0.358Y – 14 364 
212 000 – 239 000  0.453Y – 34 504 
239 000 -  0.495Y – 44 542 
  
 
Table A10 Tax rules applied in 1997 
(Married class G4 and G5 and working singles) 
Income = Y  Tax 
0 – 22 344  0 
22 344 – 156 500  0.302Y – 6 748 
156 500 – 233 000  0.358Y – 15 512 
233 000 – 262 500  0.453Y – 37 647 




Capital income is taxed with 28 percent.  38 



























Hours worked at the hospital and in a private extra practice.  
All hospital physicians with data on extra hours. Observed and predicted hours in hospital job and in private extra practice. a) 
Observed hours in 1995; Four predictions in 1995 based on: b) observed wages, c) a 10 percent wage increase in the hospital 
sector, d) a 10 percent ‘wage’ (fee) increase in the private sector and e) a 10 percent wage increase in both sectors. f) Observed 

































Male Hospital Consultants - Hours Worked at the Hospital and in a Private Extra Practice.  
Male specialist consultants with data on extra hours. Observed and predicted hours in hospital job and in private extra practice. a) 
Observed hours in 1995; Four predictions in 1995 based on: b) observed wages, c) a 10 percent wage increase in the hospital 
sector, d) a 10 percent ‘wage’ (fee) increase in the private sector and e) a 10 percent wage increase in both sectors. f) Observed 
hours in 1997 and g) predicted hours in 1997 based on observed wages and ‘preferences’ based on the 1995 data.  
 39 
 

























Figure 3  
Hospital Physicians Observed in 1995 & 1997- Hours Worked at the Hospital and in a Private Extra 
Practice. Observed and predicted hours in hospital job and in private extra practice. a) Observed hours in 1995; Four 
predictions in 1995 based on: b) observed wages, c) a 10 percent wage increase in the hospital sector, d) a 10 percent ‘wage’ (fee) 
increase in the private sector and e) a 10 percent wage increase in both sectors. f) Observed hours in 1997 and g) predicted hours 
in 1997 based on observed wages and ‘preferences’ based on the 1995 data.  
 











































Observed hours per year in 1995 and 1997 in hospital job, and calculated estimate of hours in private 
practice for hospital physicians. The salaries at public hospital increased significant during this period.  40 
 


























Average working hours per week  for all physicians in 1997. - Main and extra job.   a) Observed hours in 
1997;  Six predictions in 1997 based on: b) observed wages, c) a 10 percent wage increase in the hospital sector, d) a 10 percent 
wage increase in the public primary care sector , e) a 10 percent ‘wage’ (fee) increase in the private sector, e) a 10 percent wage 
increase in the remaining sectors, and  f) a 10 percent wage increase in all sectors.  41 
 Appendix 5 Observed and predicted choices  
 
Table P4 
Physicians at NALRA hospitals in 1995. Observed and Predicted Choices 
Jr. Physicians and Hospital Consultants 
        Predictions with   Predictions with   Predictions with 
 Main  Extra Observed Predicted 10%  increase  in   10% increase in   10% increase in  
   Hours  Hours shares   Probability   hospital wages  private wages  both wages 
PH11 18  0 0.0050 0.0709 0.0036 0.0030 0.0029 0.0026 0.0034 0.0029  0.0028 0.0025
PH12 18  6 0.0040 0.0628 0.0032 0.0021 0.0026 0.0018 0.0033 0.0022  0.0027 0.0019
PH13 18 12 0.0011 0.0329 0.0026 0.0012 0.0021 0.0011 0.0028 0.0014  0.0023 0.0012
PH14 18 18 0.0018 0.0424 0.0018 0.0007 0.0015 0.0006 0.0022 0.0008  0.0017 0.0007
PH15 18 24 0.0004 0.0190 0.0012 0.0004 0.0009 0.0003 0.0015 0.0005  0.0012 0.0004
PH21 22  0 0.0029 0.0536 0.0027 0.0020 0.0023 0.0018 0.0026 0.0019  0.0022 0.0017
PH22 22  6 0.0011 0.0329 0.0023 0.0012 0.0019 0.0011 0.0024 0.0013  0.0020 0.0012
PH23 22 12 0.0014 0.0379 0.0017 0.0006 0.0014 0.0006 0.0019 0.0007  0.0016 0.0006
PH24 22 18 0.0004 0.0190 0.0011 0.0003 0.0009 0.0003 0.0014 0.0004  0.0011 0.0004
PH25 22 24 0.0007 0.0268 0.0007 0.0002 0.0006 0.0002 0.0009 0.0003  0.0007 0.0002
PH31 28  0 0.0072 0.0846 0.0017 0.0009 0.0015 0.0009 0.0016 0.0009  0.0014 0.0009
PH32 28  6 0.0014 0.0379 0.0013 0.0005 0.0011 0.0004 0.0013 0.0005  0.0011 0.0005
PH33 28 12 0.0011 0.0329 0.0009 0.0002 0.0007 0.0002 0.0009 0.0002  0.0008 0.0002
PH34 28 18 0.0011 0.0329 0.0005 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0006 0.0001  0.0005 0.0001
PH35 28 24 0.0011 0.0329 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001  0.0003 0.0001
PH41 38  0 0.1157 0.3199 0.1151 0.0373 0.1071 0.0378 0.1077 0.0369  0.1005 0.0372
PH42 38  6 0.0422 0.2010 0.0743 0.0109 0.0684 0.0121 0.0751 0.0117  0.0694 0.0128
PH43 38 12 0.0151 0.1221 0.0427 0.0055 0.0390 0.0053 0.0467 0.0059  0.0427 0.0057
PH44 38 18 0.0058 0.0757 0.0214 0.0058 0.0194 0.0052 0.0253 0.0069  0.0230 0.0062
PH45 38 24 0.0058 0.0757 0.0092 0.0039 0.0083 0.0035 0.0117 0.0050  0.0106 0.0045
PH51 37.5  0 0.0962 0.2949 0.0918 0.0245 0.0867 0.0255 0.0859 0.0244  0.0813 0.0252
PH52 37.5  6 0.0523 0.2226 0.0570 0.0055 0.0534 0.0066 0.0577 0.0060  0.0541 0.0071
PH53 37.5  12 0.0216 0.1455 0.0314 0.0047 0.0291 0.0043 0.0343 0.0050  0.0319 0.0046
PH54 37.5  18 0.0086 0.0926 0.0150 0.0046 0.0138 0.0041 0.0177 0.0054  0.0163 0.0049
PH55 37.5  24 0.0050 0.0709 0.0060 0.0028 0.0055 0.0025 0.0077 0.0036  0.0071 0.0032
PH61 40.5  0 0.0944 0.2925 0.0872 0.0153 0.0848 0.0168 0.0814 0.0157  0.0795 0.0171
PH62 40.5  6 0.0295 0.1694 0.0508 0.0027 0.0490 0.0030 0.0513 0.0025  0.0496 0.0030
PH63 40.5  12 0.0105 0.1017 0.0260 0.0054 0.0249 0.0048 0.0283 0.0057  0.0272 0.0052
PH64 40.5  18 0.0040 0.0628 0.0114 0.0042 0.0108 0.0038 0.0134 0.0049  0.0128 0.0045
PH65 40.5  24 0.0079 0.0887 0.0042 0.0021 0.0039 0.0020 0.0053 0.0027  0.0050 0.0025
PH71 45.5  0 0.1438 0.3509 0.0649 0.0050 0.0679 0.0052 0.0605 0.0054  0.0634 0.0057
PH72 45.5  6 0.0577 0.2331 0.0339 0.0059 0.0351 0.0055 0.0341 0.0056  0.0354 0.0053
PH73 45.5  12 0.0180 0.1330 0.0152 0.0050 0.0156 0.0050 0.0165 0.0054  0.0170 0.0053
PH74 45.5  18 0.0101 0.1000 0.0057 0.0027 0.0058 0.0027 0.0067 0.0032  0.0069 0.0032
PH75 45.5  24 0.0076 0.0867 0.0017 0.0011 0.0018 0.0011 0.0022 0.0014  0.0022 0.0014
PH81 50  0 0.1038 0.3050 0.0646 0.0133 0.0743 0.0146 0.0601 0.0122  0.0693 0.0134
PH82 50  6 0.0559 0.2297 0.0301 0.0099 0.0342 0.0109 0.0302 0.0097  0.0345 0.0107
PH83 50 12 0.0187 0.1356 0.0118 0.0055 0.0133 0.0061 0.0128 0.0059  0.0145 0.0065
PH84 50 18 0.0065 0.0803 0.0038 0.0023 0.0042 0.0025 0.0044 0.0026  0.0050 0.0029
PH85 50 24 0.0047 0.0683 0.0009 0.0007 0.0011 0.0008 0.0012 0.0009  0.0013 0.0010
PH91 55  0 0.0180 0.1330 0.0585 0.0221 0.0747 0.0280 0.0543 0.0203  0.0695 0.0258
PH92 55  6 0.0036 0.0599 0.0235 0.0116 0.0298 0.0146 0.0236 0.0115  0.0299 0.0145
PH93 55 12 0.0029 0.0536 0.0078 0.0048 0.0098 0.0059 0.0084 0.0051  0.0106 0.0064
PH94 55 18 0.0022 0.0465 0.0020 0.0015 0.0025 0.0018 0.0024 0.0017  0.0029 0.0021
PH95 55 24 0.0014 0.0379 0.0065 0.0160 0.0046 0.0116 0.0061 0.0153  0.0043 0.0111
         1.0000   1.0000   1.0000   1.0000   1.0000  
Standard deviations in italics                
                     
Hours per week                  
Hospital   42.3 6.2 41.8 1.2 42.5 1.4 41.7 1.2  42.4 1.4
Private extra practice  4.1 6.2 5.2 0.9 5.0 0.9 5.7 1.0  5.5 1.0
Total     46.5 8.6 47.0 1.9 47.5 2.1 47.4 2.0  47.9 2.1
                      
Hours per year                   
Hospital   2032 298 2008 60 2041 68 2002 59  2034 67
Private extra practice  198 296 250 43 240 41 275 49  264 47
Total     2230 413 2258 93 2281 98 2277 97  2299 102
                     
Elasticities           Total hours   Main job   Extra job      
Effect of an increase in hospital wages   0.1007* 0.0490 0.1627* 0.0453* -0.3961 0.1604 *  
Effect of an increase in private wages    0.0831* 0.0218 -0.0304* 0.0074* 0.9896 0.1401 *  
Effect of an increase in all wages     0.1800* 0.0598 0.1318* 0.0427* 0.5633 0.2596 *  
N=2775                   
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Table P5 
Male Hospital Consultants at NALRA Hospitals in 1995. 
Observed and Predicted Choices 
       Predictions with   Predictions with   Predictions with 
 Main  Extra Observed   Predicted 10%  increase in   10% increase in   10% increase in  
   Hours  Hours shares    Probability   hospital wages  private wages  all wages 
PH11 18  0 0.0033  0.0573  0.0017 0.0008 0.0013 0.0007 0.0016 0.0007  0.0012 0.0006
PH12 18  6 0.0039  0.0627  0.0019 0.0008 0.0014 0.0007 0.0019 0.0008  0.0015 0.0007
PH13 18 12 0.0007  0.0256  0.0018 0.0007 0.0013 0.0006 0.0020 0.0008  0.0015 0.0006
PH14 18 18 0.0013  0.0363  0.0015 0.0005 0.0011 0.0004 0.0018 0.0006  0.0013 0.0005
PH15 18 24 0.0000  0.0000  0.0011 0.0004 0.0008 0.0003 0.0014 0.0005  0.0010 0.0004
PH21 22  0 0.0020  0.0444  0.0015 0.0006 0.0012 0.0005 0.0013 0.0005  0.0011 0.0005
PH22 22  6 0.0007  0.0256  0.0015 0.0005 0.0011 0.0005 0.0015 0.0005  0.0012 0.0005
PH23 22 12 0.0013  0.0363  0.0013 0.0004 0.0010 0.0003 0.0014 0.0004  0.0011 0.0004
PH24 22 18 0.0000  0.0000  0.0010 0.0003 0.0007 0.0002 0.0012 0.0003  0.0009 0.0003
PH25 22 24 0.0007  0.0256  0.0006 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 0.0008 0.0003  0.0006 0.0002
PH31 28  0 0.0000  0.0000  0.0010 0.0003 0.0009 0.0003 0.0009 0.0003  0.0008 0.0003
PH32 28  6 0.0013  0.0363  0.0009 0.0002 0.0007 0.0002 0.0009 0.0002  0.0007 0.0002
PH33 28 12 0.0007  0.0256  0.0007 0.0001 0.0006 0.0001 0.0008 0.0002  0.0006 0.0002
PH34 28 18 0.0000  0.0000  0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0005 0.0001  0.0004 0.0001
PH35 28 24 0.0020  0.0444  0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001  0.0003 0.0001
PH41 38  0 0.0815  0.2737  0.0906 0.0179 0.0804 0.0181 0.0833 0.0170  0.0740 0.0171
PH42 38  6 0.0388  0.1932  0.0663 0.0089 0.0584 0.0097 0.0670 0.0091  0.0591 0.0099
PH43 38 12 0.0151  0.1221  0.0419 0.0051 0.0366 0.0055 0.0465 0.0056  0.0408 0.0060
PH44 38 18 0.0059  0.0767  0.0224 0.0039 0.0195 0.0037 0.0272 0.0047  0.0237 0.0045
PH45 38 24 0.0039  0.0627  0.0099 0.0026 0.0085 0.0023 0.0131 0.0035  0.0114 0.0031
PH51 37.5  0 0.0631  0.2433  0.0744 0.0125 0.0673 0.0130 0.0683 0.0120  0.0619 0.0124
PH52 37.5  6 0.0598  0.2372  0.0520 0.0054 0.0466 0.0063 0.0525 0.0055  0.0472 0.0064
PH53 37.5  12 0.0263  0.1601  0.0311 0.0034 0.0278 0.0036 0.0345 0.0036  0.0309 0.0039
PH54 37.5  18 0.0131  0.1140  0.0157 0.0028 0.0139 0.0026 0.0190 0.0034  0.0169 0.0032
PH55 37.5  24 0.0066  0.0808  0.0065 0.0018 0.0057 0.0016 0.0086 0.0023  0.0076 0.0021
PH61 40.5  0 0.0828  0.2757  0.0779 0.0093 0.0732 0.0103 0.0715 0.0093  0.0673 0.0100
PH62 40.5  6 0.0342  0.1818  0.0503 0.0028 0.0469 0.0038 0.0507 0.0028  0.0474 0.0038
PH63 40.5  12 0.0092  0.0955  0.0276 0.0028 0.0255 0.0028 0.0305 0.0029  0.0283 0.0030
PH64 40.5  18 0.0039  0.0627  0.0126 0.0024 0.0115 0.0022 0.0152 0.0029  0.0140 0.0027
PH65 40.5  24 0.0079  0.0885  0.0046 0.0014 0.0042 0.0012 0.0061 0.0018  0.0056 0.0017
PH71 45.5  0 0.1368  0.3437  0.0662 0.0045 0.0680 0.0046 0.0607 0.0049  0.0625 0.0050
PH72 45.5  6 0.0592  0.2360  0.0372 0.0023 0.0379 0.0018 0.0374 0.0022  0.0382 0.0017
PH73 45.5  12 0.0178  0.1321  0.0174 0.0026 0.0176 0.0025 0.0192 0.0028  0.0195 0.0026
PH74 45.5  18 0.0099  0.0988  0.0066 0.0016 0.0066 0.0016 0.0080 0.0020  0.0080 0.0019
PH75 45.5  24 0.0072  0.0848  0.0020 0.0007 0.0020 0.0007 0.0026 0.0009  0.0026 0.0009
PH81 50  0 0.1446  0.3519  0.0781 0.0116 0.0900 0.0125 0.0714 0.0110  0.0828 0.0120
PH82 50  6 0.0789  0.2697  0.0380 0.0067 0.0434 0.0071 0.0381 0.0066  0.0438 0.0071
PH83 50 12 0.0243  0.1541  0.0151 0.0037 0.0172 0.0040 0.0166 0.0040  0.0189 0.0044
PH84 50 18 0.0092  0.0955  0.0048 0.0016 0.0054 0.0017 0.0057 0.0019  0.0065 0.0021
PH85 50 24 0.0053  0.0724  0.0011 0.0005 0.0013 0.0005 0.0015 0.0006  0.0017 0.0007
PH91 55  0 0.0230  0.1500  0.0830 0.0220 0.1086 0.0285 0.0757 0.0203  0.0999 0.0265
PH92 55  6 0.0053  0.0724  0.0339 0.0101 0.0440 0.0129 0.0339 0.0101  0.0443 0.0130
PH93 55 12 0.0046  0.0677  0.0110 0.0040 0.0142 0.0050 0.0120 0.0043  0.0156 0.0055
PH94 55 18 0.0026  0.0512  0.0027 0.0012 0.0035 0.0015 0.0033 0.0014  0.0042 0.0018
PH95 55 24 0.0013  0.0363  0.0020 0.0050 0.0013 0.0033 0.0017 0.0042  0.0012 0.0030
         1.0000    1.0000   1.0000   1.0000   1.0000  
Standard deviations in italics                
                     
Hours per week                  
Hospital   43.5  6.1  42.9 1.0 43.9 1.1 42.7 1.0  43.7 1.1
Private extra practice  4.6  6.2  5.4 0.6 5.1 0.5 6.0 0.7  5.7 0.6
Total     48.0  8.3  48.3 1.1 49.0 1.2 48.7 1.2  49.4 1.2
                     
Hours per year                  
Hospital   2086  295  2061 47 2107 54 2052 46  2098 54
Private extra practice  219  299  257 27 244 26 288 31  275 30
Total     2305  398  2318 54 2352 59 2340 55  2373 60
                     
Elasticities           Total hours   Main job   Extra job     
Effect of an increase in hospital wages   0.1461* 0.0301 0.2252* 0.0342 -0.4911* 0.0928   
Effect of an increase in private wages    0.0957* 0.0158 -0.0434* 0.0074 1.2072* 0.0792   
Effect of an increase in all wages     0.2390* 0.0279 0.1833* 0.0337 0.6773* 0.1237   
N=1521                   
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Table P6 
Hospital Physicians with full dataset in 1995 and 1997. 
Observed and Predicted Choices.  Jr. Physicians and Hospital Consultants 
        Predictions with   Predictions with   Predictions with 
 Main Extra  Observed   Predicted 10%  increase  in   10% increase in   10% increase in  
   Hours Hours  share   Probability   hospital wages  private wages  all wages 
PH11 18 0  0.0019 0.0439  0.0017 0.0016 0.0012 0.0013 0.0015 0.0015  0.0011  0.0012
PH12 18 6  0.0029 0.0538  0.0016 0.0012 0.0011 0.0009 0.0017 0.0012  0.0012  0.0010
PH13 18 12  0.0000 0.0000  0.0013 0.0007 0.0009 0.0006 0.0015 0.0009  0.0011  0.0007
PH14 18 18  0.0010 0.0311  0.0010 0.0004 0.0007 0.0004 0.0013 0.0006  0.0009  0.0005
PH15 18 24  0.0000 0.0000  0.0007 0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 0.0010 0.0004  0.0007  0.0003
PH21 22 0  0.0010 0.0311  0.0013 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 0.0012 0.0010  0.0009  0.0008
PH22 22 6  0.0000 0.0000  0.0011 0.0007 0.0008 0.0006 0.0012 0.0007  0.0009  0.0006
PH23 22 12  0.0019 0.0439  0.0009 0.0004 0.0006 0.0003 0.0010 0.0004  0.0007  0.0004
PH24 22 18  0.0000 0.0000  0.0006 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0008 0.0003  0.0006  0.0002
PH25 22 24  0.0000 0.0000  0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0005 0.0002  0.0004  0.0002
PH31 28 0  0.0039 0.0620  0.0008 0.0005 0.0006 0.0004 0.0007 0.0005  0.0006  0.0004
PH32 28 6  0.0000 0.0000  0.0006 0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 0.0006 0.0003  0.0005  0.0002
PH33 28 12  0.0000 0.0000  0.0004 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0005 0.0001  0.0004  0.0001
PH34 28 18  0.0010 0.0311  0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001  0.0002  0.0001
PH35 28 24  0.0000 0.0000  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001
PH41 38 0  0.0772 0.2671  0.0998 0.0373 0.0857 0.0370 0.0914 0.0364  0.0790  0.0357
PH42 38 6  0.0232 0.1505  0.0657 0.0129 0.0558 0.0142 0.0669 0.0137  0.0572  0.0149
PH43 38 12  0.0068 0.0820  0.0381 0.0065 0.0321 0.0066 0.0432 0.0071  0.0366  0.0073
PH44 38 18  0.0010 0.0311  0.0191 0.0058 0.0160 0.0050 0.0241 0.0073  0.0203  0.0063
PH45 38 24  0.0048 0.0693  0.0080 0.0037 0.0067 0.0031 0.0113 0.0053  0.0094  0.0045
PH51 37.5 0 0.0753 0.2640  0.0783 0.0247 0.0687 0.0254 0.0717 0.0243  0.0633  0.0246
PH52 37.5 6 0.0309 0.1731  0.0494 0.0072 0.0429 0.0086 0.0502 0.0077  0.0439  0.0091
PH53 37.5 12 0.0048 0.0693  0.0273 0.0047 0.0235 0.0046 0.0309 0.0051  0.0267  0.0050
PH54 37.5 18 0.0039 0.0620  0.0129 0.0042 0.0110 0.0036 0.0163 0.0053  0.0140  0.0046
PH55 37.5 24 0.0048 0.0693  0.0051 0.0024 0.0043 0.0021 0.0071 0.0035  0.0061  0.0030
PH61 40.5 0 0.0985 0.2981  0.0812 0.0180 0.0745 0.0199 0.0743 0.0182  0.0684  0.0197
PH62 40.5 6 0.0270 0.1622  0.0478 0.0037 0.0434 0.0052 0.0485 0.0038  0.0443  0.0054
PH63 40.5 12 0.0068 0.0820  0.0243 0.0049 0.0219 0.0044 0.0275 0.0052  0.0249  0.0048
PH64 40.5 18 0.0029 0.0538  0.0105 0.0038 0.0093 0.0034 0.0132 0.0048  0.0118  0.0042
PH65 40.5 24 0.0058 0.0759  0.0037 0.0019 0.0033 0.0017 0.0052 0.0027  0.0046  0.0024
PH71 45.5 0 0.1834 0.3872  0.0668 0.0065 0.0678 0.0076 0.0609 0.0073  0.0622  0.0083
PH72 45.5 6 0.0714 0.2577  0.0346 0.0046 0.0349 0.0038 0.0351 0.0043  0.0355  0.0035
PH73 45.5 12 0.0164 0.1271  0.0152 0.0045 0.0152 0.0042 0.0172 0.0049  0.0173  0.0046
PH74 45.5 18 0.0097 0.0978  0.0055 0.0025 0.0055 0.0024 0.0069 0.0031  0.0069  0.0030
PH75 45.5 24 0.0097 0.0978  0.0016 0.0009 0.0015 0.0009 0.0022 0.0013  0.0022  0.0013
PH81 50 0  0.1535 0.3606  0.0832 0.0160 0.0970 0.0167 0.0757 0.0147  0.0888  0.0157
PH82 50 6  0.0792 0.2701  0.0379 0.0108 0.0439 0.0115 0.0384 0.0107  0.0446  0.0114
PH83 50 12  0.0261 0.1594  0.0143 0.0060 0.0165 0.0066 0.0161 0.0067  0.0186  0.0073
PH84 50 18  0.0068 0.0820  0.0043 0.0024 0.0049 0.0027 0.0054 0.0030  0.0062  0.0034
PH85 50 24  0.0077 0.0876  0.0010 0.0007 0.0011 0.0008 0.0014 0.0010  0.0016  0.0011
PH91 55 0  0.0319 0.1757  0.0962 0.0345 0.1313 0.0454 0.0873 0.0312  0.1199  0.0414
PH92 55 6  0.0087 0.0928  0.0372 0.0168 0.0504 0.0219 0.0376 0.0167  0.0512  0.0221
PH93 55 12  0.0029 0.0538  0.0116 0.0065 0.0156 0.0086 0.0130 0.0073  0.0176  0.0096
PH94 55 18  0.0039 0.0620  0.0028 0.0019 0.0037 0.0025 0.0035 0.0024  0.0047  0.0032
PH95 55 24  0.0019 0.0439  0.0037 0.0108 0.0022 0.0068 0.0035 0.0101  0.0021  0.0064
     1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000   
Standard deviation in italics                
                     
Hours  per  week                 
Hospital   44.4 5.8  43.3 1.5 44.5 1.7 43.1 1.4  44.3  1.7
Private extra practice  3.6 5.9  4.9 0.9 4.6 0.9 5.6 1.1  5.2  1.0
Total     48.0 8.4  48.2 2.0 49.1 2.2 48.7 2.1  49.5  2.2
                      
Hours per year                    
Hospital   2130 279  2079 70 2136 83 2070 68  2127  81
Private extra practice  174 283  234 43 219 41 267 52  251  49
Total     2304 403  2312 95 2355 103 2337 99  2378  107
                     
Elasticities           Total hours   Main job   Extra job      
Effect of an increase in hospital wages   0.1855* 0.0565 0.2735* 0.0601 -0.6019* 0.1688   
Effect of an increase in private wages    0.1048* 0.0265 -0.0434* 0.0117 1.4141* 0.1752   
Effect of an increase in all wages     0.2821* 0.0621 0.2290* 0.0558 0.7402* 0.2720   




Table P7 A Prediction Experiment on 1997 Data 
Observed Choices in 1997 and Predicted Choices in 1997.  
Predictions based on 1995 Model Parameters and 1997 Wages.  
    
All Hospital Physicians  Male Hospital Consultants  Hospital Physicians observed in 
1995 & 1997 
    N=1553 N=790  N=1036 
  Main Extra     Predicted with      Predicted with      Predicted with 
   Hours Hours  Observed 1997  1997 wages  Observed 1997  1997 wages  Observed 1997  1997 wages 
PH11 18 0  0.0064 0.0800  0.0025 0.0022 0.0025 0.0503 0.0009 0.0004 0.0029 0.0538  0.0025  0.0022
PH12 18 6  0.0013 0.0359  0.0024 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000  0.0024  0.0015
PH13 18 12  0.0019 0.0439  0.0020 0.0009 0.0025 0.0503 0.0013 0.0004 0.0019 0.0439  0.0020  0.0009
PH14 18 18  0.0013 0.0359  0.0016 0.0005 0.0013 0.0356 0.0013 0.0005 0.0010 0.0311  0.0016  0.0005
PH15 18 24  0.0032 0.0567  0.0011 0.0004 0.0051 0.0710 0.0012 0.0005 0.0010 0.0311  0.0011  0.0004
PH21 22 0  0.0058 0.0759  0.0020 0.0015 0.0038 0.0615 0.0008 0.0003 0.0048 0.0693  0.0020  0.0015
PH22 22 6  0.0019 0.0439  0.0018 0.0010 0.0025 0.0503 0.0010 0.0003 0.0010 0.0311  0.0018  0.0010
PH23 22 12  0.0013 0.0359  0.0014 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0003 0.0010 0.0311  0.0014  0.0005
PH24 22 18  0.0000 0.0000  0.0010 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000  0.0010  0.0002
PH25 22 24  0.0019 0.0439  0.0007 0.0002 0.0025 0.0503 0.0007 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000  0.0007  0.0002
PH31 28 0  0.0097 0.0978  0.0014 0.0008 0.0013 0.0356 0.0007 0.0002 0.0077 0.0876  0.0014  0.0008
PH32 28 6  0.0019 0.0439  0.0011 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0002 0.0019 0.0439  0.0011  0.0004
PH33 28 12  0.0026 0.0507  0.0008 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0001 0.0010 0.0311  0.0008  0.0001
PH34 28 18  0.0039 0.0621  0.0005 0.0001 0.0038 0.0615 0.0005 0.0001 0.0019 0.0439  0.0005  0.0001
PH35 28 24  0.0019 0.0439  0.0003 0.0001 0.0025 0.0503 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000  0.0003  0.0001
PH41 38 0  0.1120 0.3155  0.0967 0.0392 0.0506 0.2194 0.0633 0.0140 0.0956 0.2941  0.0967  0.0392
PH42 38 6  0.0212 0.1443  0.0663 0.0115 0.0127 0.1119 0.0548 0.0074 0.0154 0.1234  0.0663  0.0115
PH43 38 12  0.0058 0.0759  0.0412 0.0056 0.0025 0.0503 0.0412 0.0057 0.0039 0.0620  0.0412  0.0056
PH44 38 18  0.0019 0.0439  0.0228 0.0075 0.0000 0.0000 0.0263 0.0060 0.0000 0.0000  0.0228  0.0075
PH45 38 24  0.0026 0.0507  0.0110 0.0058 0.0013 0.0356 0.0139 0.0048 0.0019 0.0439  0.0110  0.0058
PH51 37.5 0  0.0824 0.2751  0.0786 0.0275 0.0633 0.2436 0.0535 0.0107 0.0936 0.2915  0.0786  0.0275
PH52 37.5 6  0.0373 0.1897  0.0519 0.0064 0.0266 0.1610 0.0443 0.0049 0.0405 0.1973  0.0519  0.0064
PH53 37.5 12  0.0097 0.0978  0.0310 0.0051 0.0063 0.0794 0.0315 0.0041 0.0135 0.1155  0.0310  0.0051
PH54 37.5 18  0.0052 0.0716  0.0164 0.0060 0.0025 0.0503 0.0189 0.0044 0.0048 0.0693  0.0164  0.0060
PH55 37.5 24  0.0058 0.0759  0.0074 0.0042 0.0013 0.0356 0.0094 0.0033 0.0058 0.0759  0.0074  0.0042
PH61 40.5 0  0.1017 0.3024  0.0776 0.0204 0.1316 0.3383 0.0593 0.0099 0.1245 0.3303  0.0776  0.0204
PH62 40.5 6  0.0258 0.1585  0.0482 0.0028 0.0367 0.1882 0.0453 0.0032 0.0319 0.1757  0.0482  0.0028
PH63 40.5 12  0.0071 0.0839  0.0268 0.0059 0.0101 0.1002 0.0295 0.0035 0.0097 0.0978  0.0268  0.0059
PH64 40.5 18  0.0026 0.0507  0.0130 0.0056 0.0025 0.0503 0.0160 0.0038 0.0029 0.0538  0.0130  0.0056
PH65 40.5 24  0.0045 0.0670  0.0054 0.0033 0.0051 0.0710 0.0070 0.0026 0.0068 0.0820  0.0054  0.0033
PH71 45.5 0  0.1410 0.3482  0.0637 0.0081 0.1291 0.3355 0.0581 0.0071 0.1448 0.3521  0.0637  0.0081
PH72 45.5 6  0.0528 0.2237  0.0356 0.0050 0.0392 0.1943 0.0384 0.0009 0.0483 0.2144  0.0356  0.0050
PH73 45.5 12  0.0116 0.1071  0.0175 0.0060 0.0190 0.1366 0.0213 0.0029 0.0125 0.1114  0.0175  0.0060
PH74 45.5 18  0.0077 0.0876  0.0073 0.0039 0.0114 0.1062 0.0096 0.0026 0.0068 0.0820  0.0073  0.0039
PH75 45.5 24  0.0032 0.0567  0.0025 0.0018 0.0038 0.0615 0.0034 0.0014 0.0039 0.0620  0.0025  0.0018
PH81 50 0  0.1436 0.3508  0.0722 0.0103 0.1696 0.3755 0.0819 0.0108 0.1458 0.3530  0.0722  0.0103
PH82 50 6  0.0534 0.2250  0.0362 0.0103 0.0759 0.2651 0.0468 0.0050 0.0550 0.2281  0.0362  0.0103
PH83 50 12  0.0219 0.1464  0.0156 0.0073 0.0367 0.1882 0.0220 0.0043 0.0203 0.1410  0.0156  0.0073
PH84 50 18  0.0116 0.1071  0.0056 0.0036 0.0190 0.1366 0.0082 0.0026 0.0097 0.0978  0.0056  0.0036
PH85 50 24  0.0071 0.0839  0.0016 0.0013 0.0114 0.1062 0.0023 0.0010 0.0029 0.0538  0.0016  0.0013
PH91 55 0  0.0419 0.2003  0.0750 0.0221 0.0570 0.2319 0.1051 0.0212 0.0415 0.1996  0.0750  0.0221
PH92 55 6  0.0200 0.1399  0.0327 0.0146 0.0266 0.1610 0.0502 0.0106 0.0193 0.1377  0.0327  0.0146
PH93 55 12  0.0090 0.0945  0.0119 0.0073 0.0152 0.1224 0.0192 0.0055 0.0077 0.0876  0.0119  0.0073
PH94 55 18  0.0039 0.0621  0.0035 0.0027 0.0051 0.0710 0.0056 0.0022 0.0039 0.0620  0.0035  0.0027
PH95 55 24  0.0006 0.0254  0.0043 0.0103 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0015 0.0010 0.0311  0.0043  0.0103
         1.0000   1.0000   1.0000   1.0000   1.0000   1.0000   
Standard deviations in italics                
                      
Hours per week                  
Hospital   43.4 7.1  42.7 1.2 45.0 6.8 44.1 0.8 43.7 6.5  42.7  1.2
Private extra practice  3.6 5.9  5.5 1.3 4.0 6.2 6.2 0.9 3.2 5.5  5.5  1.3
Total     47.0 9.1  48.2 2.3 49.0 9.0 50.3 1.2 46.9 8.6  48.2  2.3
                        
Hours per year                      
Hospital   2082 342  2049 59 2160 326 2116 40 2096 310  2049  59
Private extra practice  171 285  266 60 194 299 298 44 156 266  266  60




Table P9 All physicians in 1997. Observed and Predicted Choices.   
      Predictions with Predictions with  Predictions with Predictions with Predictions with 
  Main ExtraObserved share Predicted choice 10% increase in  10% increase in   10% increase in 10% increase in 10% increase in 
   HoursHours          hospital wages primary care wages private wages other wages all wages 
PH11 18 0 0.0091 0.0951  0.0088 0.0077 0.0082 0.0078 0.0087 0.0077 0.0077 0.0070 0.0084  0.0074 0.0069 0.0066
PH12 18 6 0.0106 0.1024  0.0132 0.0088 0.0121 0.0090 0.0131 0.0087 0.0122 0.0082 0.0130  0.0086 0.0107 0.0080
PH13 18 12 0.0043 0.0655  0.0183 0.0097 0.0164 0.0102 0.0180 0.0095 0.0178 0.0095 0.0183  0.0095 0.0155 0.0092
PH14 18 18 0.0048 0.0693  0.0232 0.0107 0.0204 0.0115 0.0227 0.0103 0.0239 0.0117 0.0235  0.0102 0.0206 0.0107
PH15 18 24 0.0047 0.0686  0.0263 0.0125 0.0228 0.0131 0.0258 0.0118 0.0290 0.0155 0.0269  0.0114 0.0246 0.0131
PH21 22 0 0.0057 0.0751  0.0118 0.0090 0.0111 0.0092 0.0117 0.0090 0.0105 0.0083 0.0113  0.0085 0.0095 0.0080
PH22 22 6 0.0079 0.0884  0.0165 0.0095 0.0153 0.0100 0.0164 0.0094 0.0154 0.0088 0.0163  0.0093 0.0138 0.0089
PH23 22 12 0.0054 0.0730  0.0212 0.0095 0.0193 0.0104 0.0210 0.0093 0.0207 0.0092 0.0213  0.0094 0.0185 0.0094
PH24 22 18 0.0063 0.0791  0.0247 0.0097 0.0221 0.0108 0.0244 0.0093 0.0256 0.0104 0.0251  0.0093 0.0226 0.0101
PH25 22 24 0.0068 0.0823  0.0255 0.0106 0.0224 0.0114 0.0251 0.0101 0.0281 0.0131 0.0262  0.0099 0.0245 0.0115
PH31 28 0 0.0826 0.2753  0.0170 0.0110 0.0162 0.0114 0.0169 0.0109 0.0156 0.0106 0.0163  0.0103 0.0143 0.0102
PH32 28 6 0.0569 0.2316  0.0213 0.0103 0.0200 0.0111 0.0212 0.0102 0.0202 0.0097 0.0210  0.0100 0.0187 0.0101
PH33 28 12 0.0330 0.1785  0.0242 0.0088 0.0224 0.0101 0.0241 0.0087 0.0240 0.0082 0.0244  0.0090 0.0222 0.0093
PH34 28 18 0.0276 0.1638  0.0245 0.0078 0.0224 0.0092 0.0243 0.0076 0.0255 0.0078 0.0251  0.0079 0.0235 0.0086
PH35 28 24 0.0324 0.1772  0.0213 0.0077 0.0191 0.0084 0.0211 0.0074 0.0234 0.0091 0.0220  0.0075 0.0214 0.0086
PH41 38 0 0.0055 0.0737  0.0199 0.0118 0.0193 0.0122 0.0199 0.0118 0.0190 0.0123 0.0191  0.0108 0.0178 0.0117
PH42 38 6 0.0092 0.0957  0.0214 0.0097 0.0205 0.0104 0.0214 0.0097 0.0209 0.0098 0.0212  0.0094 0.0200 0.0102
PH43 38 12 0.0057 0.0751  0.0203 0.0072 0.0193 0.0081 0.0203 0.0072 0.0206 0.0067 0.0206  0.0075 0.0198 0.0080
PH44 38 18 0.0055 0.0737  0.0165 0.0053 0.0154 0.0060 0.0164 0.0052 0.0174 0.0049 0.0170  0.0058 0.0167 0.0060
PH45 38 24 0.0035 0.0588  0.0108 0.0041 0.0100 0.0043 0.0108 0.0040 0.0120 0.0044 0.0113  0.0044 0.0115 0.0047
PH51 37.5 0 0.0020 0.0446  0.0210 0.0125 0.0205 0.0129 0.0210 0.0125 0.0203 0.0134 0.0202  0.0114 0.0192 0.0126
PH52 37.5 6 0.0038 0.0614  0.0216 0.0100 0.0208 0.0107 0.0216 0.0100 0.0213 0.0104 0.0214  0.0097 0.0205 0.0107
PH53 37.5 12 0.0018 0.0422  0.0194 0.0072 0.0185 0.0080 0.0194 0.0072 0.0197 0.0069 0.0197  0.0075 0.0192 0.0081
PH54 37.5 18 0.0009 0.0307  0.0146 0.0050 0.0138 0.0056 0.0146 0.0050 0.0155 0.0046 0.0151  0.0055 0.0151 0.0058
PH55 37.5 24 0.0012 0.0340  0.0088 0.0035 0.0082 0.0037 0.0088 0.0035 0.0098 0.0037 0.0092  0.0038 0.0095 0.0041
PH61 40.5 0 0.0324 0.1772  0.0257 0.0117 0.0251 0.0122 0.0258 0.0117 0.0250 0.0134 0.0249  0.0105 0.0239 0.0124
PH62 40.5 6 0.0489 0.2157  0.0248 0.0081 0.0239 0.0089 0.0248 0.0081 0.0247 0.0090 0.0246  0.0078 0.0239 0.0093
PH63 40.5 12 0.0252 0.1567  0.0205 0.0051 0.0195 0.0058 0.0205 0.0051 0.0211 0.0050 0.0207  0.0053 0.0206 0.0061
PH64 40.5 18 0.0106 0.1024  0.0139 0.0036 0.0131 0.0040 0.0139 0.0036 0.0149 0.0036 0.0143  0.0040 0.0145 0.0042
PH65 40.5 24 0.0139 0.1169  0.0072 0.0027 0.0068 0.0027 0.0072 0.0027 0.0081 0.0031 0.0076  0.0029 0.0079 0.0031
PH71 45.5 0 0.0261 0.1595  0.0345 0.0093 0.0347 0.0096 0.0348 0.0094 0.0338 0.0121 0.0337  0.0081 0.0334 0.0106
PH72 45.5 6 0.0381 0.1914  0.0293 0.0052 0.0291 0.0054 0.0295 0.0052 0.0295 0.0065 0.0292  0.0047 0.0295 0.0061
PH73 45.5 12 0.0187 0.1354  0.0205 0.0040 0.0202 0.0039 0.0207 0.0040 0.0214 0.0042 0.0208  0.0039 0.0215 0.0041
PH74 45.5 18 0.0079 0.0884  0.0112 0.0035 0.0109 0.0033 0.0113 0.0036 0.0122 0.0039 0.0115  0.0036 0.0123 0.0037
PH75 45.5 24 0.0121 0.1092  0.0044 0.0021 0.0042 0.0020 0.0044 0.0022 0.0050 0.0025 0.0046  0.0021 0.0050 0.0024
PH81 50 0 0.1285 0.3346  0.0573 0.0205 0.0613 0.0234 0.0578 0.0202 0.0546 0.0175 0.0564  0.0208 0.0584 0.0198
PH82 50 6 0.2146 0.4106  0.0424 0.0166 0.0448 0.0182 0.0428 0.0164 0.0421 0.0151 0.0423  0.0166 0.0451 0.0164
PH83 50 12 0.0436 0.2041  0.0248 0.0118 0.0259 0.0125 0.0250 0.0118 0.0258 0.0119 0.0250  0.0117 0.0275 0.0124
PH84 50 18 0.0172 0.1301  0.0107 0.0065 0.0110 0.0066 0.0108 0.0065 0.0117 0.0071 0.0108  0.0064 0.0124 0.0073
PH85 50 24 0.0132 0.1142  0.0031 0.0024 0.0031 0.0024 0.0031 0.0024 0.0035 0.0028 0.0031  0.0024 0.0037 0.0028
PH91 55 0 0.0048 0.0693  0.0998 0.0679 0.1177 0.0833 0.1008 0.0673 0.0928 0.0586 0.0991  0.0684 0.1101 0.0734
PH92 55 6 0.0025 0.0501  0.0605 0.0440 0.0702 0.0525 0.0610 0.0437 0.0592 0.0411 0.0604  0.0440 0.0696 0.0496
PH93 55 12 0.0018 0.0422  0.0273 0.0222 0.0313 0.0259 0.0275 0.0221 0.0282 0.0225 0.0274  0.0221 0.0328 0.0263
PH94 55 18 0.0002 0.0145  0.0084 0.0079 0.0095 0.0090 0.0084 0.0079 0.0091 0.0086 0.0084  0.0079 0.0105 0.0098
PH95 55 24 0.0008 0.0290  0.0014 0.0060 0.0013 0.0059 0.0014 0.0060 0.0011 0.0044 0.0014  0.0056 0.0009 0.0039
     1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 1.0000  1.0000    1.0000 
Standard deviation in italics                       
                               
Hours per week                         
Main     40.7 10.5  39.5 4.7 40.5 5.4 39.6 4.6 39.3 4.3 39.4  4.7 40.5 4.9
Extra       7.6 7.3  9.1 1.4 8.7 1.6 9.1 1.4 9.5 1.6 9.3  1.4 9.2 1.5
Total     48.3 11.7  48.6 4.1 49.2 4.5 48.7 4.0 48.9 3.9 48.7  4.0 49.7 4.2
                               
Hours per year                           
Main     1953 503  1895 225 1946 260 1900 222 1888 208 1893  224 1945 235
Extra       365 351  439 68 417 77 436 66 458 77 446  67 440 74
Total     2319 561  2333 195 2363 215 2336 194 2347 187 2338  191 2385 200
                               
Elasticities     Total hours  Main job    Extra job                 
Wage increase in                          
Hospitals     0.1236  0.1134 0.2527 0.2299 -0.5128 0.4703        
Primary care    0.0141  0.0518 0.0307 0.1131 -0.0412 0.1558        
Private practice    0.0603  0.0689 -0.0221 0.2243 0.4527 0.6261        
Other jobs      0.0230  0.0346 -0.0097 0.0884 0.1677 0.3073        
All sectors        0.2221*  0.0400 0.2636* 0.0614 0.0127 0.1573        
 